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Draft Recommendation
on Europe and the evolving situation in the Balkans
The Assembly,
(t) Recalling the results of the Peace Implementatron Councrl in Bonn on 9-10 December 1997
whlch noted that consrderable progress had been made rn rmplementing the Dalton Peace Agreement in
Bosnia and Herzegovrna;
(ii) Aware, however, that the Peacc Implementation Council remamed concerned about the lack of
progress m many areas, such as msufftciency in operatmg corrrmon mstrfutions, the continuing existence
of rllegalgovernment structures in the Federation, madequate protection of human rights and the lack of
strong multr-ethnic political parties and of a structured civrl society, to name only a ferv of the many
issues mentioned;
(iri) Welcomrng the decrsion to grve the Hrgh Represcntative the authorrty to make brndrng decrsions
in order to facilitate the resolution of drfficultres, whrch has alrcadv led to posrtrve results in a number
of areas;
(rv) Regrettrng that a ke1' tssue rn the Darton peace process, the return of refugees and drsplaced
persons to their original homes. strll remams largely unresolvcd, grven that out of 400 000 Bosnians
who have returned over the past tu'o 1'ears, onlr' 35 000 have returned to homes ln mlnorrt), areas. u,hile
600 000 Bosnian refugees rcmarn abroad and over 800 000 remain drsplaced internally:
(r) Deploring the setbacks encountered rn the return and resettlement of refugees and drsplaced
persons m places such as Dn'ar, Den'enta and Saralevo. and rndeed throughout the terrrtory of Bosnia
and Herzegovina;
(w) Supportrng the UN Hrgh Commrssioner for Refugees' inrtrative to promote open crtles. ivhich
are commltted to provrdrng pubhc sen'lces for mrnonty returnees and u'here lornt ethnic pohce forces
are to be set up to morutor therr safetr',
(vit) Noting that rmplementatron of the results of the September 1997 munrcrpal electrons 1s stlll
runnmg up agarnst serious problems rn a number of municrpalrtrcs.
(vtr) Noting that rn Repubhka Srpska the polrtrcal and economrc rnfluence of Mr Karadzrc and his
supporters rs drminrshing.
0x) Welcomrng the politrcal changes in Repubhka Srpska u'hcre President Plavsrc and the neu,
government under Primc Mtntster Dodrk have norv shoun a rullingness to cooperate constructrr,'ely in
implementrng the Dal.ton Peace Agreement.
(x) Notrng wrth satrsfactron that as a rcsult of these polrtrcal changes rn Repubhka Srpska, an
increasing number of Bosnian Serb rndrcted u ar crrmrnals have surrendered or been arrested;
(xi) Understandrng the dectsion of the arbitratron panel for Brcko to defer final arbrtration on the
status of thrs tou.n and its rmmedrate surroundmgs to the end of 1998, u'hrch mav create the condrtions
for an overall solutron acceptablc to each of the ethnic communrties involved;
(ni) Worned about the srtuation tn Eastem Slavonra follou'rng the recent transfer of control over thrs
enclave to the govemment of Croatia, in vren' of the serrous doubts about Croatia's commitment to
promote and allow the return of refugees and drsplaced persons to therr places of orrgrn rn Croatra and
throughout the region;
(ntt) Emphasisingthatnotenough progress rs berng made on thc idcntificatron of missrng persons, an
essenttal part of thc reconctliatton process. rvhile noting that exhumatrons and rdentrfications are
currentll'takrng place in the area surroundrng Srcbrenrca under the ausplces of the ICTY.
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(nv) Consrdcnng that the mrnc-cleanng operatrons are not makrng cnough progress and that more
European funds arc needcd to accelcratc uork to demrnc aimost onc mrllron nunes lcft on Bosnran
terntory', u,hrle u'elcomrng the rcadrncss of the Rcpubhc of Slovenra to organrse a spccial trarnrng ccntre
for drilhng thc rnternatronal unrts used for dcmrrung operatlons on Bosntan terrttorl'.
(rr) Welcomrng the decrsron of thc NATO Permancnt Councrl to contmuc 1ts operatron rn Bosrua
and Herzegovma after the mandatc of thc current SFOR exprres, rnrtially' marntamrng the strength of the
troops at about 35 000. rrrth the possrbrlrty,of a rcduction after the Septcmber electrons rf the srtuatron
perrnlts,
(w,) Notrng that srnce autumn 1997. Unrted States experts and some Europeans have argued that the
Europeans should have a hrgher profilc and morc tasks rn any SFOR successor force. m partrcular
through the deplolment of an armed spccial pohce element u'rth specrfic capabilrties in the maintenance
of pubhc ordcr. so as to fill the gap betu'ecn SFOR soldrers and unarmed IPTF officers,
(wu) Notrng that the Opcratronal Plan for the nov SFOR \\.as prcsented to NATO's Mrlrtarl,
Commrttee on 20 Aprrl but that at that trme the detarled arrangemcnts for the armed special pohcc
element had not 1'et been defined. not least because of opposrtron l'orced bv several European countnes,
(wrtt) Rccalhng that in Recommendatron 619. the Assembh'recorrrmcnded the WEU Councrl to
"Consrder the possrbilitl,, rn thc hght of its experrencc u'rth thc WEU pohcc force m Mostar and
thc MAPE rn Albanra, of estabirshrng a WEU pohce forcc uhrch could rnrtralll' assrst the IPTF
undcr that command and later replacc rt. rf need be. under WEU command s,ith thc samc general
mandate and the possrbilrty' of rmplementrng rt urthout svstcmatrcallv calhng on SFOR 
- 
or rts
successor force 
- 
for support. u'hrle demonstrattng a European dctermrnatron to fulfiI rts
responsrbrlrtres for burldrng and maintarning peacc. secunt\ and stabrlrtv rn Europe",
(nx) Regrettrng that the WEU Councrl rn rts rcplv to Rccommcndatron 619 rvrongll'consrdered it
"prematureto elaborate on the questron of the estabhshmcnt of an SFOR succcssor force''. in particular
because it u'as perfectll' a\\'are of drscussrons on thrs rssuc rvithrn NATO. rncluding suggestions to
rncludc a European armed military pohce element.
(xx) Regrettrng that WEU has not made anv effort to coordrnate. pian or proposc the estabhshment
of an all-European WEU armed spccral pohcc clcmcnt and that. as a consequcnce. SFOR ma\ no\\'
lncorporate a pohcc elcment u'hrch rs not all-Europcan.
(xxr) Extremelv u.orncd about the srtuatlon rn Kosovo u'hcre the most prcdrctable Balkans crrsls
mrght easrlv escalatc rnto a fresh outbreak of unacceptable vrolcncc.
(xnt) Takrng the vrcu'that. contrary to Presrdcnt N{rlosevrc's clarm 
- 
u'hrch he consrders to hal'e been
endorsed b1'the results of a hastrll'-organrscd refcrendum on 23 Apnl 
- 
the problem m Kosovo is not an
mternal affarr rn u'hrch forergn countrles should not rnterfcre. not lcast because the consequences of
armcd vrolcncc, rncludrng a sprll-ovcr of armcd strrfe and masslvc rcfugee movements, could thrcatcn
stabrlrtl, rn the regron and European sccuntv as a rvholc,
(rnrr) Endorsrng thc common positron of the European Unron on
ln lts statement rssued on l6 March 1998. as u-ell as the decrsrons
25 March 1998,
the problem of Kosovo. as descnbed
taken b1'thc Contact Group on 9 and
(xnv) Applaudrng thc rvork of thc Sant'Egrdro Communrtv rrhrch rs dorng rts utmost to reconcrle Serbs
and Kosovar Albanrans.
(xrr) Convinced that polrtrcal and drplomatlc prcssure rs not enough to contain and solve the cnsrs rn
Kosol'o and that Europc has a specrfic responsrbrlrtv to contnbutc actrvclv and vrsrbll' to a mrhtan'
presencc m the area rn order to safcguard stabrh['and securrtv rn both FYROM and Albanra,
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RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL
I Enhance Europe's role and responsibilitres rn SFOR by urgently and senously considerrng the
deployrnent m Bosnia and Herzegovina of an all-European armed spccral police elcment with a specific
capability to mamtain public order,
2. Ask the Plannrng Cell to draw up contmgency plans addressrng all possrble options for an
effective WEU presence rn Albania and FYROM u'hrch should be able to limrt the repercussions of any
violent conflict in Kosovo;
3 Propose to the European Councrl, rn applicatron of Article VIII 3 of the modified Brussels Treaty
and Article J.7.1 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, and on the basis of thc Plannrng Cell's contingency' plans.
an effective WEU presence in both FYROM and Albania to help keep up the EU's political and
economic pressure, desrgned to prevent a new armed conflrct rn the Balkans;
4 Instruct the Planning Cell, in accordance rvith Chapter VII of thc Charter of the Unrted Natrons
and Article VIII.3. of the modrfied Brussels Treatl'. to prepare a set of optrons for possible European
intervention in Kosovo in ordcr to stop the vrolence, restore order and re-estabhsh the rule of larv rf the
situation constitutes a threat to peace.
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Expla n atory M emorandu m
(submitted by Mr Blaauw, Rapporteur)
Introduction
I The situatron rn the Balkans rs hkelr to
rcmaln on the Europcan secunt)' agenda for a
long trme to come. Ftrst and foremost there ts
Bosrua and Hcrzegovrna, u'here a peace process
has been set rn motion b1' the Darton Peacc
Agrecment Its rmplemcntation rs now u'ell undcr
wav although lt rvould appear that progress rs
being made rn fits and starts and permanent ex-
ternal pressure rs needed to make the vanous
parties rnvolved fulfil therr obhgatrons In Feb-
ruary 1998, NATO's Permanent Councrl decrded
to contrnue rts operatron in Bosnia after the man-
date of the current SFOR explres The presencc
of forergn troops rvas strll considered rndrspen-
sable for the marntenancc of a stable securrtv
envrronment and for helprng thc Hrgh Represen-
tatrvc and the international organrsatrons ln-
volved to conduct their tasks
2 Unfortunately', Bosnra and Herzegovlna ls
not the onlv area of concern rn the Balkans In
1997, chaos and anarchv broke out rn Albanra
Fu(her detenoratron of the srtuatron \\'as pre-
vented bv rnternatronal drplomatrc lnterventron
and the deployment of a European mrlrtary force
wrth Italv as the lead natron Strll. the countn'
has not 1,et full;- recovercd and sustained efforts-
rn partrcular bl the European rnstrtutrons. urll bc
needed to help the countn' stand on rts own fcet
3 Recentlr'. a smouldenng cnsrs erupted rn
Kosovo and herc too. thc sltuatron poses a scrl-
ous secuntv threat to the regron Europe and the
Unrtcd States arc makrng efforts to defuse the
crrsrs and convrncc both Scrbra and the Kosol'ar
Albanrans to start ncgotratrons. but so far not
much hcadu'a1 has been made
4 Altogether, therc are manv reasons for
morutonng developments closely. rn partrcular
because Europe has a spccrfic rcsponsrbrlrtl for
the marntcnance of peace and sccunt\ tn lts o\\n
rcgron WEU, berng the onlv Europcan dcfencc
organrsatlon uhrch rs also supposed to become
the defence componcnt of the Europcan Unron,
has a dutl' to plal'a role rn the Balkans The prc-
sent report endcavours to provrde an assessment
of the srtuatron rn thc Balkans and to drau con-
clusrons on Europe's and WEU's role rn that re-
glon
Part I: Implementation of the
Dayton Peace Agreement
l. The dfficult road
to common institutions
5 At lts mectrng rn Bonn on 9-10 December
1997, the Peace Implementatron Council noted
that consrderable progress had been made in rm-
plementing peace and stability in Bosnra and
Herzcgovina since rts prevrous meeting in June
1997 lt mcntroned notable progress rn the fol-
Iorving areas
- 
munrclpal elcctrons in September and
specral clectrons for the Repubhka
Srpska Assemblv rn November;
- 
arrns control and confidence- and sc-
currtl'-burldlng measures.
rcstructunng and reform of the pohce.
- 
bcgrnnrng of thc retum of minorrtres to
the Federatron and. to a lesser degree,
to Repubhka Srpska.
- 
economlc rcvrval rn the Federatton.
- 
del'elopment of non-partrsan profes-
sronal medra-
- 
a doubhng of thc numbcr of persons
rndrcted for u'ar crimes tn the custody'
of thc Internatronal Crrminal Tnbunal
for formcr Yugoslavta (ICTY).
6 On the other hand. thc Councrl pubhshed a
much longer hst of matters of conccm Among
them. rt crtcd the foilorr rng
- 
the maJont\. of common lnstltutlons are
operatlng rnsufficrcntiv Permanent
facrlrtrcs havc not bccn established.
- 
rllcgal structures of govcrnment rn the
Federatron have not been dissolved or
lntcgrated-
- 
senous problems of local admmtstra-
tron, notablv rn Mostar. contlnue to
exrst The rmplementatlon of municrpal
elcctions strll encounters reststance ln
sevcral munrcrpalrtrcs,
- 
Iack of strong multr-cthntc polrtical
partres and a structured crvrl soclet)',
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lack of legislatron on dcminrng and thc
continuing manufacture of mines,
human nghts are strll not adequately
protected Citizenship rs not legally
defined. There is no Bosrua and Herze-
govlna passport. Property and housrng
lcgislatron block the return of refugees
and drsplaced persons to therr pre-tvar
homes The pohce are still sometlmes
used to obstruct the implementatron of
election results, do not deal effectrvely
with politically or ethnically motrvated
crimes. are responsible for documented
cases of abuse of persons in custody,
and more generalll, are not sufficrently
obliged by the political leadershrp to
advance the goals of the Peacc Agree-
ment. Human rights violatlons remaln
endemrc, desprte improvement ln some
areas,
nerther Entity has taken the nccessary
steps to ensure that its lau's are com-
patrble rvrth the European Conventron
on Human Rrghts In both the Feder-
atron and Repubhka Srpska, the fair
tnal standards set forth rn the Conven-
tlon are clearly and routrnelv vrolated,
Bosnra and Herzegovma strll has no
.yointll'agreed flag,
comprehensrve plans to facrlrtate re-
turns have not been implemented,
there are no functionrng Pubhc Colpo-
ratrons,
Bosnra and Herzegovina has farled to
finance its corrrmon instrtutrons or
servlce rts extemal debt on time. rm-
plement conunon pohcres on forergn
trade. appl1, a corrrmon customs tanff,
lssue common bank notes, achreve
transparency and good governance in
the use of pubhc funds, and estabhsh
effective mstrtutrons to curb corruptlon
and revenue evasion The lack of an
economlc pohcy framervork rs prel'ent-
rng an IMF Standbv Arrangement and
World Bank adjustment lendrng and
renders the countn' lulnerable to fin-
ancial crisis;
fulI normahsation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina's relations rvrth its lrrrme-
diate neighbours has not taken place
7. Exasperated b1' thc apparent lack of pro-
gress on a number of issucs rvhrch lt consrdered
vrtal for the further rmplemcntatron of the Dalton
Peacc Agreement, the Councrl sct several dead-
lmes It demanded that thc Draft Crtrzenshrp and
Travel Documcnt Law's be adopted by 15 Dcc-
ember 199-l as cndorscd b1, the Presrdcncl, m
Bonn It rs to bc noted that at thc Council's
mceting in Bonn, the prcsrdencl, of Bosnia and
Herzegovrna agreed on the dcsrgn of the Bosnian
passport and on a new lalv definrng crtrzenshrp
but that these measures had to be approved by'
the Federal parhament rn Saralevo'.
8 Concluding that rnsuffrcrent actron had
been taken to estabhsh a unlform svstem of
vehiclc registrailon and obhgatory' third-part1'
liabrlrtl' car lnsurance, thc Councrl urged thc
Councrl of Mmrsters and thc Entrty Governments
to agree to the relevant Memorandum of Under-
standrng and the Councrl of Mrnrsters Regulation
immedrately, It u'elcomcd thc Hrgh Represent-
ativc's lntentron, after 3l January 1998, to rm-
plement the unrform hcensrng s)'stem rn coopera-
tron u'rth the IPTF and SFOR
9 The Councrl urgcd the authoritrcs of the
Repubhc of Croatra and the Repubhc of Bosnia
and Herzegovina to agrcc on a new non-discnmr-
natory visa regimc and remove other barners to
free travel b1' I March 1998. rncludrng thc es-
tabhshment of normal and non-discnminatory
customs and border formalrties at all border
crosslng polnts
l0 The Hrgh Reprcsentatlve \\as rnvrted to set
m trarn a process lcadrng to a dccrsron on a ne\\.
flag and sr mbols rf the partres could not agree on
thctr onn br 3l Deccmber 1997
I I Deplonng thc fact that the authontres of
Bosnra and Herzegovrna had farled to adopt the
Lau' on the Councrl of Mrnrsters. the Councrl
demanded that the Draft Lau' be adopted b1
l5 Decembcr 1991. addrng that appropnate
measurcs uould bc takcn b1,' the High Repre-
scntatrvc rn thc event of non-comphance
12 The Councrl consrdercd rt unacceptable
that the package ofessentral legrslatron cstabhsh-
rng thc corrrmon rnstrtutrons of cconomtc man-
agcment had not been mrplcmented rn full and
It-,rrrr*t '[tmes. l0 Decembcr 1997
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that the state-lcvcl legrslatron, spccrfied rn the
Srntra Dcclaratron had not becn adoptcd.
13 Amorig other thrngs, rt dcmandcd that thc
compctent authontres m Bosnra and Herzcgovina
and the Entrtres
- 
submrt to the prrnters by 20 December
1997. agreed desrgns for the conunon
currcnc)' coupons and pubhcly' an-
nouncc the trmetable for therr mtroduc-
tlon,
- 
adopt the Forergn Investment Lau' by'
20 December 1997,
- 
apph' the lntenm common customs
tanff schcdule bv 20 December 1997
14 In ordcr to accelerate thc peace rmplemen-
tatron process. the Council granted the Hrgh Rcp-
resenLatlve, Carlos Westendorp, su'eeping pou'-
ers. In rts conclusrons, the Peace Implementatton
Councrl u,elcomed the High Representatrve's
intention to use hrs final authority rn order to
facrhtate the resolutron of drfficultres b1' makrng
bindrng decrsrons. as he ludged necessary on the
follorvrng issues
"(a) trmrng.location and charrmanshrp of
mectlngs of thc common instltutlons:
(b) nlenm measures to take effect ivhen
partrcs are unable to reach agrecment.
u'hrch u'rll remarn rn force unttl the Prcsr-
deno or Councrl of Mrnistcrs has adopted
a decrsron conslstent rvrth thc Peace
Agreement on the issue concerned,
(c) other mcasures to ensure rmplemen-
tatron of the Peace Agrcement throughout
Bosnra and Herzegovrna and rts Entrtres,
as uell as the smooth runnrng of the com-
mon rnstrtutlons . "
l-5 The Council concluded that the Fcderal
Republic of Yugoslavra had not comphed rvrth
the request from the Steenng Board to raprdll'
ahgn the Agreement cstabhshing a Spccral Paral-
lel Rclatronshrp betrveen the Federal Repubhc of
Yugoslavra and Repubhka Sryska rvrth the Peace
Agreement The alignment of this Agreement
uas to proceed tmmedratell,
16 In Novembcr 1997, thc Croatran Govcrn-
ment unverlcd plans for increased cooperatron
rvrth thc Fcderation, rncludrng proposals for a
customs unlon, a monetan' unlon. the cstabhsh-
ment of a free-trade zonc and cooperation rn edu-
catron. culture and many other fields Manv
cntlcs consrdercd thrs as another rnrtratrvc to
further undcrmrnc thc Repubhc of Bosnra and
Herzcgovrna. follorvrng rcpcated Croat accusa-
trons that the Mushms were trl,rng to domrnate
the Fcderatron and u'crc preventrng tens of thous-
ands of Croat refugees from returnrng to their
homes
17 The Councrl declared this proposal for a
specral parallel relatronshrp rvith the Federation
lnconslstent rvith the Peace Agreement and de-
manded that thc partles proceed rmmediatelv rvrth
the ahgnment of thc Agreement u rth the Peace
Agreement
l8 On 13 Decembcr, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavra and the Repubhka Srpska concluded
an agreement on double crtrzenshrp u,hrch u,as
denounced as rllegal b1 both the Presrdent of
Bosnra and Herzegovrna and the rntematronal
communrtv It should be noted that the Repub-
hka Sryska and the Fedcratron of Bosnra and
Herzcgovina are not soverelgn states and that. as
a consequence, thev cannot conclude trcatres rvrth
other states
19. At rts Bonn mectrng. the Councrl had re-
called that agreements cstabhshrng specral paral-
lel relatronshrps must be consrstent u'ith the sov-
ereignh and terrrtorral rntegritv of Bosnra and
Herzegovrna The Councrl further recalled that
the Peace Agreement has prrmacv over prevlous
Agreements betrreen the Partres
20 On 16 December 1997. the Hrgh Repre-
sentatrvc rssued a dccree rn u'hrch he rmposed a
neu' cltlzenshrp lau upon Bosnra and Herze-
govrna aftcr parhament had becn unable to adopt
a larr' uhrch had bccn agrced among the three
members of the state prcsrdencv Usrng hrs man-
date, the Hrgh Representatrve declared the nerv
larv vaird ad rnterrnt Thrs prehmrnary lahdrty
rvas to end as soon as thc Bosnran parhament
adopted the lau'"rn its present state and urthout
amendments and addrtronal condrttons"
2l At the end of Dccembcr. the Hrgh Repre-
scntatn,e, Carlos Westcndorp, rmposed the pro-
vrsronal entn, into forcc of the larv on common
customs tanffs and the settlng-up of the Bosnra
and Herzegovrna Mrne Clearance Commrttce and
a Coordrnatron Centre for Mmes, after havrng
concludcd that thc Councrl of Mrnrsters of
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Bosnia and Hcrzegovlna had been unable to take
these trvo decrsions2
22 In Januarl' 1998, the two Entrtres rcached
an agrcement on the rntroduction of new car
licence plates. The existing plates rvere a maJor
obstacle to estabhshing frecdom of movement
and the return of refugees because they clearly
indicated the ethnrc origin of the car oi'vners On
4 February, the Hrgh Representative decided to
impose a now flag upon Bosnia and Herzegovina
when the Bosnran Parliament agarn farled to
rcach agreement on this matter.
2. Refugees and displaced persons
23. In rts conclusions after the meetmg m
Bonn on 9-10 December 1997, the Peace Imple-
mentatron Councrl rvelcomed the return of
400 000 rcfugees and displaced persons srnce the
signing of the Peacc Agreemcnt, rncludmg more
than I l0 000 refugees from abroad n l99l It
noted, however. that over 600 000 Bosnian refu-
gees remaln abroad and over 800 000 Bosnians
remaln dlsplaccd internallv
24 The Council further noted that the overall
condrtrons for return had not signrficantly im-
proved and that large numbers of returnrng refu-
gees and drsplaced persons are berng relocated
agarnst therr rvrll to places other than therr origr-
nal homes
25. The Councrl dcmanded that the authonties
in Bosnra and Herzegovina act resolutelv to re-
move all barners to retum. Such barricrs in-
cludc lack of adequate securlty, refusal to facrli-
tate the return of property, lelyrng of so-called
uar taxes, failure to establish a svstem of access
to personal documents, exrstrng registratron
processes, uncertamty concerrung applicable
customs regulatrons and tanffs, deficrencres rn
the allocation of temporary housing, and the lack
of effrcrencl, of admrnrstratrve organs. The
Council rnvrted the Hrgh Representatrve to
transmrt to the Steering Board a regularl.r- up-
dated list of barriers and the measures necessarv
to ensure therr removal
26. On 14 January' 1998, thc UN Hrgh Com-
missroner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, asked for
NATO's support for the accclerated return of
refugees in Bosnra Thc post-SFOR forergn
mrlitary presence should m her opinion also rn-
TAtlo,',tn l,,l"rys, 3l December 1997
clude a raprd reactron forcc rn order to guarantce
the safety of those refugees rvho return homc
Accordrng to mformatron provrded by, the Hrgh
Commrssroner, of thc 400 000 Bosnrans who
have returned ovcr the past trvo years. onh,
35 000 have retumed to areas rvherc thel,are tn a
minontv The Hrgh Commrssroner expressed the
hope that 50 000 more rvould return by the end
of the SFOR mandate, and that a further 200 000
rvould return home by the end of the y,ear.
27. A rccent report3 of the Commrttee on Mrg-
ratlon, Refugees and Demography, of the parha-
mentary Assembly of the Councrl of Europe
spelled out in detarl the problems corurccted wrth
the consequences of the rnternal and external
displacement of approxrmately' 2 2 mrllion pcople
as a result of the conflrct rn Bosnia and Herze-
govina
28 The Unrtcd Natrons Hrgh Commlssroner
for Refugees (UNHCR) has alreadv taken a
number of rnrtialves to facilitate the rcturn of
refugees and drsplaced persons, such as lncentlve
packages and repatnatlon asslstance. the shelter
prograrnme. the desrgnatron of so-callcd target
areas in uhrch investment is concentrated rn
shelter and rnfrastructure so as to rnclude ab-
sorption capacltv. the sponsorrng of specral m-
terclt)' bus seryrces and the "open crties" rnrtra-
trves
29. It is to be notcd. horvever. that refugees
and drsplaced persons trylng to return to mrnontv
areas are encountenng man1, legal and other
problems Accordrng to the abovcmentroned re-
port, there ls a massrve shortfall of fundrng to
provide housrng for rcturnrng and drsplaced per-
sons The latter ars occupytng the homcs of
others at the moment About 80% of rcturnces
find no Jobs on therr return. Indeed, the unem-
ploynent rate ln thc Federation rs about 50%. rn
Republrka Srpska rt rs between 60'/, and 90o/o
The situation rs cxacerbated by the lack of polrtr-
cal r,r,rll to bnng about repatnatron
30 Desprte posltlve measures such as the rn-
troductron of common hcence plates for cars for
the whole terntorv of the Repubhc of Bosnra and
Herzegovrna, therc rs strll a lack of freedom of
movement betr,veen thc tu-o Entrties and rvrthrn
T notr*ira Ilerzegot,tna return oJ refugees ond clts-
placed persons, Rapporteur Mr Iuinski (Document
79'73)
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thc Federatron Undue restrtcttons are cnforccd
b1, an abuse of admrnistrattve authonty and the
re-educatton of the local pohcc strll has a long
u'a1' to go beforc rt wrll be able to tmplcment
both the letter and sprnt of the Day'ton Accords,
partrcularll'Armex 7, the Agreement on Refugees
and Displaced persons.
3l The office of the UNHCR has taken the
initrative to promote open citles In that frame-
work. munictpalrttes that still contained some
minontres dunng the s'ar are committed to pro-
vrdrng public services for minorrty returnees; and
joint ethnrc pohce forces are to come rnto being
to monltor therr safety There are erght such
crtres alreadl', of x'hich t$'o are in Republika
Srpska. It is hoped that the rdea will spread all
over Bosnta. eventuallv to perhaps as many as 40
crtles These ctttcs should also be demrncd and
the LINHCR has plans to organtse multr-ethnrc
demrning groups to help m thts.
32. Efforts are concentrated on Banla Luka
and Sarajevo, both of u'hrch have a tradrtion of
multr-ethnrcrtv In partrcular. the capital Sara-
levo should set an example to the rest of the
countn' At a conference in Saralevo on refugee
returns tn early February 1998, the High Repre-
sentatrve even u'ent so far as to say that aid
rvould stop unless Sarajevo tnvtted back its for-
mer Serb restdcnts Mr Westendorp also prom-
rsed to exclsc from the Fedcration's property lau',
provlslons u'htch block refugees from reclatmtng
therr homes
33 It rs to be notcd that rn endrng ethnic seg-
regatron and tn helprng the return of refugees, a
malor effort still has to be made not only bv the
Repubhka Srpska but also by the Federatton as a
rvhole Mutual concesslons in these fields could
breathe life rnto central rnstttutions, improve the
functrontng of the central bureaucracl' and en-
courage more refugees to return
34 In the precedtng report on Europe's role tn
the Balkansa, rt was pornted out that the munici-
pal elcctrons, held on l3 and 14 September 1997
s'ould make lrttle sensc tf the results rvere not
rmplcmented so as to rcflect the multr-ethnrc
compositron of thc local populatron before thc
\\'ar.
35 It was also argued that thc neu'ly-clected
municrpal counctls rvould be of no use tf there
was no massive rctum of refugces and displaced
persons to therr pre-war homes At present,
seven months aftcr the munrcipal clections, thrs
whole process has gonc no further than rmple-
mentatron of the first stage
36 Thc srtuatton in Srebrenica is an example.
When this torvn rvas captured by the Serbs rn
July 1995, all the Mushm rnhabrtants \\'ere ex-
pelled or killed by' thc Serbs. In the municipal
elections, a Mushm coalttton u'on 24 of the 45
seats in the municrpal counctl. One seat ts oc-
cupied by an rndependent Mushm and the re-
marrung 20 seats are ln Serb hands Until the
end of March 1998. harassment and other ob.1ec-
tronable practlces b1' Serb ctttzens and muructpal
councrllors had prevented the Council from
meeting A mal'or and deputl' ma)'or have not
vet even been elected The OSCE, rn cooperatlon
rvith the Hrgh Representatlve, has now decrded to
put a provlsronal end to the mandate of the mun-
rcrpal councillors The Hrgh Representative r.vrll
nominate an admmtstrator u'ho rvrll preslde a
tcmporary "executive council" rncluding both
Mushms and Serbs
3. War criminals
37 At rts meettng rn Bonn on 9-10 December
1997. the Peacc Implementatton Counctl agatn
confirmed lts convtctlon ''that until all persons
rndicted for lvar cnmcs are brought before thc
ICTY. there wrll bc no normaltsatton, no recon-
crhation. and the rule of lau' tn Bosnta and
Herzegovtna ll'tll remam sertousl! tmpatred"
38 Srnce then, rmportant progress has been
made in the efforts to brrng the rndicted u'ar
crtmtnals to tnal The recent parltamentarl' elec-
trons in the Repubhka Srpska, follorved b1' the
nomination of a moderate prlme mtntster, have
led to a more cooperattvc govemment in the
Serbian Entrty of Bosnta and Herzegovtna and to
the recognrtion that a better relationshrp betwecn
the tu'o Entrties and a lastmg peace wrll not be
possrble rvrthout a sufficrent degree ofjustice
39 The Pnme Mtntster, Milorad Dodrk,
acccpts that all those indrcted for war crlmes
should go before the ICTY tn The Hague for
tnal, but he has noted that spectfic SFOR opera-
trons to arrest Serbs rndrcted of war crimes ma1'.
under ccrtain clrcumstances cause politrcal.1 Ar**btt Documcnt 1589
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problams because such a pohcv may plav rnto
the hands of hard-hne polrticrans. The new polrti-
cal chmate has provoked thc voluntarl, surrender
of a number of indrcted u'ar cnmlnals
40 Durrng the nrght of l7-18 December 1997,
SFOR units detained tu,o Bosnran Croats, Vlatko
Kupreskic and Anton Furundzla, rndicted for
rvar crimes by the Internatronal Cnminal Trrbu-
nal for former Yugoslavra Russra deplored the
arrest whrch, rt felt, $'as "an action planned out-
srde thc SFOR mandate"
4l On 22 January 1998, SFOR acted to de-
tain Goran Jelisic, rndicted for war crimes by the
ICTY The actron u'as taken rn accordance wrth
SFOR's mandate, rvhrch allou's rt to arrest in-
drcted u,ar cnminals rvhen thev are encountered
rn the course of its duties Thrs rvas the first time
that US arm),troops acted to capture a suspected
x'ar cnminal. Human rrghts groups had crrti-
crsed the US Admrnistratron for refusing to let
US troops seize any'ofthcse suspects
42 On the other hand, the US Govcrnment
remains adamant rn rts pohcl' not to expose its
troops to unnecessarl' nsks The Unrted States
Specral Envol', Robert Gclbard. recentlv declared
(25 Februari' 1998) that hrs countn,u.ould make
an assessment of the suspects rvho have been
rndrcted bt, the ICTY Thosc u,hose rndictment
u'ould be Sudged too rveak to guarantee a convlc-
tron rvould be left at large. but the others u'ould
be arrestcd b1'the US SFOR contrngent
13 On l4 Februan' I998. Miroslav Tadic and
Mrlan Srmic, Bosnran Serbs rndrcted for u,ar
cnmcs, surrendered to Amerrcan drplomats and
to SFOR This leaves 
-52 "pubhclr. indicted"
rndrviduals strll to surrendcr
14 On 24 Fcbruary 1998. Srmo Zarrc, a
Bosnran Serb rndrcted for u'ar crimes by the
ICTY, surrendcred to the Bosnran pohce m
Bosanskr Samac He u'as then handed over to
SFOR and thc ICTY
45 These rndrvrduals are all rndrcted for u,ar
cnmes commrttcd m Bosanskr Samac, a toun in
the so-called Posavrna corndor betu'een the east-
ern and u'cstcrn part of Repubhka Srpska u'here
the l7 000 Croat and Mushm rnhabrtants u,ere
erpclled. an opcration rvhrch rncluded maltrcat-
ment. torturc and krlhngs Thc other rndrviduals,
rndrcted for rvar cnmes rn thc samc torvn 
-
Blagole Srmrc, Stcvan Todorovic and Slobodan
Mrllkovrc 
- 
are strll at large
46 The first surrcndcr of Scrbian r.r,ar crime
suspects u'as the result of more than a vear of
negotiations among officrals of the ICTy and a
laul'er representing thc suspects Lcss than a
rveek earlier, the Bosnran Serb pnme Mrnrster.
Mrlorad Dodrk, had statcd that hrs govemmcnt
would do everlthrng rt could to encouragc sus-
pects to surrender
47 The Bosnian Scrb rndrcted war crrmrnal,
Zoran Zrgtc, declarcd on 3 March that hc was
plannrng to surrender to the ICTY On 4 March.
another Bosruan Scrb. Dragollub Kunarac, rn-
dicted for \\'ar cnmes rn or around Foca, surren-
dercd to French SFOR soldrers and u,as subse-
quently taken to the ICTY rn The Hague Later.
Mr Kunarac openlv admitted the cnmes for
ri'hrch he had bcen rndrctcd
48 On 8 Apnl, SFOR arrestcd Mrroslav
Kvocka and Mladen Radrc, both charged urth
\\'ar cnmcs commltted rvhrle runnrng the noto-
rious detcntion camp in Omarska. near the toun
of Pn;edor Thev havc been transferred to the
ICTY rn The Hague
49. At the time of u'rrtrng thrs report ( l8 Apnl
1998). 27 persons x'sre in the hands of the
ICTY. rvhrch had officiallv rndrcted 79 persons.
of u,hom three drcd and three rverc released
50 In the medra rnuch emphasls ls put on thc
need to arrest thc u'ell-knou'n suspects Karadzrc
and Mladic, but thc press tends to overlook the
fact that the1, havc bcen rncreasrnglv margmal-
rsed by' recent polrtrcal developmcnts and that. as
a consequence. thelr arrest or surrender ls no\\.
probably only, a mattcr of trme and the noosc
seems to be tightenrng
5l Recentll', on 2 Apnl, some 100 SFOR
vehrcles including tanks and armoured personnel
carners and 400-500 SFOR troops carned out an
operatron rn Pale. the tradrtronal stronghold of
Mr Karadzrc Deplovcd around Bosnran Serb
government burldrngs and thc house and offices
of Mr Karadzic. thcv rnspected comphance b1'
the Bosnran Scrb spccral pohce and confiscatcd
assault rifles and amrnunrtron Hrgh Representa-
tn,c Carlos Westendolp pornted out that Mr
Karadzrc's potvcr base has drmrnrshed nou, that
he has lost polrtical control u.hrle hrs specral
pohce uruts arc undcr SFOR control It rs sard
ll
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that Mr Karadztc has contacted laul ers and that
he rs tryrng to negotiatc hrs posrtion5
52 It should also be borne m mrnd that the
arrest of the main suspects of the Bosnran Serb
leadershrp can only be a lustrfiablc legal oblec-
tive, lrrespcctive of its destabrhsrng conse-
quences, rf the same treatment is meted out to
Croat and Mushm leaders dunng the confltct,
u'ho for the ttme berng have been immunised
against any rndictment
53 The situation of the ICTY has constd-
erably tmproved stnce the second half of 1997.
Untrl then, in the four years since rts estabhsh-
ment b1' the United Nations Secuntl' Councrl in
1993, the tribunal had managed to try onlv one
suspect, u'hile holdrng only seven ln custodl'
54. In The Hague there are 26 rndrcted uar
cnmmals rn custody. rvhile one has been allou'ed
to retum homc for health reasons pendrng hrs
tnal At the moment, seven trtals are under u'ay,
rvrth more due in the near future Out of a total
of 79 rndrcted persons, tu'o have dred and three
have been released
55 SFOR has demonstrated its dctermtnatton
to use force, tfneed be, for the arrest of suspects
For i998, the UN has tncreased the tnbunal's
budget b1' nearll' a thrrd to $64 mtllion, rvhich
has enabled the court to htre more laulers. ln-
vestlgators and translators The Prestdent of the
Court u'ants procedurcs to be streamhned so that
the tnbunal can prove that it can hold trtals ex-
pedrtrouslr and fatrlv
56 France had s1'stematrcallv refused to let
French mtlttan' officers gtve evtdence to the
ICTY Thrs pohcl' was finally abandoned uhen
the Frcnch Foreign Mtntster vtstted The Hague
on 16 March. The Mrnrster pledged that hencc-
forth French officrals and mtlttan'officers u'ould
be authonsed to testrfii beforc the rntcrnatronal
court. On the other hand. the Minrster tnststed
that France u'ould avarl rtsclf of all the possrbrli-
tres offered b1' the rulcs of the court
4. International arbitration over Brcko
57 It rvrll be remembcrcd that according to
Article V of thc Agrcement on the Intcr-Entrty
Boundary hne (Annex 2 to the Darton Agree-
ment), the Partres agrecd to brnding arbttratron of
' 
t,, ,\.'tonau.l0 and 16 Apnl 1998 and Internatronal
Herald Trtbune,l0 and l3 Apnl 1998
the drsputcd portlon of thc Inter-Entrty Boundan'
Lrne in the Brcko arca Arbitratron was to be the
task of one arbttrator appolnted b1' the Federa-
tron, one appornted by the Repubhka Srpska and
one to be sclected by agrcemcnt of the Parties'
appomtces If they could not agree, the thrrd
arbitrator u'ould bc apporntcd by'the President of
the Internatronal Court of Justrce The proceed-
rngs rvould be conducted m accordance with
L|NCITRAL (Unrted Nattons Commtsston on
Intemational Trade Lau') rules and the arbttra-
tors were to lssue therr decisron no later than one
vear from the entry into force of thc Day'ton
Peace Agrcement
58 Before its setzure by the Serbs rn Mal'
1992, Brcko had a populatron u'hich v'as 44oh
Muslrm. 26oh Croat and 2l% Serb. After the
serzure, vrrtually all rts non-Serbs rvere expelled
or krlled. The arbrtratton dectston had already'
becn postponed m Deccmber 1996 and rn Febru-
ary 1997, s'hcn the toun tvas placed under an
rntematlonal superviston team headed bv thc US
drplomat Robert Farrand. u'ho u'as also to over-
see Brcko's ethnic retntcgratlon Arbttrailon rvas
agarn postponed untrl March 1998 The Munrcr-
pal Statute uas amended tn order to estabhsh a
multi-ethnrc admmtstratton. judrcrary and poltce
force rn Brcko. All the polrtrcal partles partlcl-
pated rn the formatron of these muitr-ethnrc bod-
res and some progrcss \\'as made. However. hard-
llne Serbs have succeeded rn blockrng most of the
efforts to achteve retntegratton and the return of
refugees and drsplaced persons
59 In Februan, 1998, thc Prestdent of the Re-
pubhka Srpska. Brljana Plavstc. argued that
control over Brcko should be grl'cn to the Serbs
because that u'ould help the moderates to utn the
Scptcmber 1998 clecttons6 Prtme Mtntster
Dodrk said that hrs govemmcnt uould do cvery-
thrng rn rts po\\'er to ensure that Brcko \\as re-
turned to thc Serb Entity' of Bosnta
60 On l-5 March 1998. the arbrtration panel
for Brcko. presided b1' Robert Ou-en. decrded 1'et
agaln to defer final arbttratton on the status of
thrs toun and its tmmcdtate surroundtngs until
the end of 1998 Mr Ouen argued that general
rnstabtlttl' tn the regron and a rapidly' shifting
polrtrcal scene tn the Rcpubhka Srpska 
.lustrfied
this further dela1,
t2
6 Inlernatronal Herakl Trtbune. l4-15 Februan' 1998
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61 The arbrtration committee also explarned
that rt u,ould give the ne\\' govcrrrment of Repub-
hka Srpska time to succeed rn rts reformrst
policy It added that rf srgnificant changes uere
to take place rn favour of restormg a multi-ethnic
cornrnunlty m Brcko, this could have a consrdcr-
able rnfluence on the final decisronT The rcpre-
sentatives of the Republika Srpska, Vttomtr
Popovic, and of the Croat-Muslim Federatron,
Caam Sadikovic, rvho have a consultative vote
in the three-member arbitration committee, re-
fuscd to sign the decision
62. The Bosnian Serbs have alu'ays argued
that urthout control over Brcko, therr Repubhka
Srpska would be cut in two, smce the town is
situated on a narrow neck of land connectrng the
trvo halves of Scrbran-controlled terntory m
Bosrua For the Muslims in Bosnra and Herze-
govina, the nvcr port of Brcko provrdes the only'
access route to central Europe through the Save
and the Danube. It is also an imporlant road and
railroad junctron
63 At the moment, it seems most likely' that
the final arbrtration rvill contatn a kind of split-
the-difference formula where po\\'er u'ould be
shared by the vanous authoritres, This solutron
rvould have a burlt-rn rrsk in that it u'ould farl as
soon as one side calculated that rt could take by,
force u'hat had not been accorded through elec-
tions or medration.
5. Political changes in
Republika Srpska
64 The parhamentar), elections held in Rep-
ublrka Srpska on22 and 23 November 1997 led
to a change in the power relations betu'cen the
drfferent politrcal parties. The Serb Democrattc
Party (SDS), under the unofficral leadershrp of
Radovan Karadzrc, remained the largest party
nrth around 32o/o of votes. Wrth 24 seats as
compared ri'ith the 45 seats \\'on ln the 1996
electrons, however, it lost rts ovcrall maJontv m
parhament The Muslim-led coalrtron for a Sin-
gle and Democratrc Bosnia and Herzegovtna
(KCD) u'on 16 seats, rvhile the Serb Radrcal
Party of the Serb Republic (SRS), an all1, of the
SDS, rvon 15 seats, the same number as the re-
cently-estabhshed Serb Natronal Alliance (SNS)
headed by Brljana Plavsic. The Socrahst Party',
u'hich has hnks wrth Slobodan Mtlosevic's Soc-
T t" lrtr*, t9 March 1998
rahst Party of Serbra, won 9 seats and the Socral
Democratrc Part1, (SDP) and Party of Independ-
ent Social Democrats (SNSD) each won tu'o
seats in the 83-seat parltament
65 With the hard-line supporters m the neu,ly-
elected parliament of Republika Srpska only
holding 39 of the 42 scats needed for a maloritr',
there were consrdcrable drfficulties in formrng a
new govemment The High Representative,
Carlos Westendorp, warned that he would re-
move obstructionrst hard-hne deputies from parl-
iament by mid-February rf the u'ranghng over the
formatron of a government continued.
66. On 12 Januan' 1998. the newly-elected
parhament of Republika Srpska was finally con-
stituted After a walk-out of 39 hard-hne dep-
uties, moderate Serb and Muslim deputres on 18
January voted for Mr Mrlorad Dodrk, leader of
the Independent Socral Democrat party, as Prime
Minister of the ne\\' government m rvhrch the
radical natronahsts do not partrcrpate. The 2l
membcrs of the nerv Govemment of Repubhka
Srpska under the Primc Minister, Milorad Dodrk,
were sworn in on I February 1998. The Parlia-
ment decided to transfer the seat of government
from Pale to Banla Luka It rvas also decided to
abohsh all the lau's adopted by' the previous
parliament rvhich u'as dominated by radical
nationalists.
67 Mr Dodik pledged strict tmplementatlon of
the Dayton Peace Agreement and promrsed to
accelerate pnvatlsatron of the economy' He also
pledged to cnd censorshtp and to separate the
government from the Serbran Orthodox Church,
rvhich has supported the hard-ltners. Mr Dodrk
asked the Hrgh Representative for US$ 30 mil-
lion in start-up funds for his government.
68 European Unron ministers rmmedrately
agreed on a US$ 6 6 mrllion aid package, rvhtch
u'as to be used to pay the salary arrears of
police, teachers and others, consohdating the
authorrtl, of the neu' government This dccisron
n'as follou'ed on 26 January 1998 by a pledge
from the World Bank of US$ l7 mrlhon credit,
the first element of a US$ 65 mrlhon programme
of reconstruction aid *'hich ls now becomtng
avarlable rn rts cntrrety Mr Dodrk has also
promrsed an operatronal plan to encourage Mus-
hm or Croat refugees to return, rvhich u'ould re-
quire actron rn all parts of the country because so
many refugees hal'e taken possesston of the
l3
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homcs of other refugees8. On 27 January 1998,
the Contact Group for Bosnra stated that the rn-
ternatronal communlty was ready to back the nerv
government of Repubhka Srpska undcr thc Pnme
Minister, Mrlorad Dodrk
69. Once Mr Dodrk's ne\\' government has
drafted a full budget, it u'rll be ehgrble for a
substantral part of the US$ I 5 bilhon m ard
pledged b1' thc mternational community for the
reconstruction of Bosnra and Herzegovrna So
far, Republika Srpska has only recerved 5% of
the total amount of aid pledged
70. On l6 February,, Presrdent Biljana Plavsrc
nommated General Mounir Talic to replace Gen-
cral Pero Cohc, a supporter of Radovan Karad-
zic, as the commander of the armed forces
General Talic rs knou.n to support Presrdent
Plavsic rn her power struggle rvrth Karadzic
6. The transfer of Eastern Slavonia
to Croatia
71. On 15 January' 1998, the Unrted Natrons
Transitional Admrnrstratlon ln Eastern Slavonia
(LINTAES) transferred control over this cnclave
to the government of Croatra ln agreement rvith
the govemment, a l80-strong United Natrons
crvilian pohce force rvrll stay in Eastern Slavonra
for a maxrmum penod of nme months The
OSCE rvill maintain a 250-strong morutonng
mission untrl the end of 1998
72 It wrll be remembered that rn the autumn
of 1991, Serbran troops took possession of thrs
enclave rn a vrolent offensrve whrch rcduced thc
regional caprtal, Vukovar, to rurns and forced
some 80 000 Croats rnto exile Therr homes are
now occupred by, around 60 000 Serb refugees.
manl' of rvhom were expclled from therr homes m
the Kralina regron by Croats On the other hand.
the Croat adminrstration is not alloiving ethnrc
Serbs to return to houses from rvhich they uere
driven in other parts of Croatra, desprte the
promlses that w,ere glven to the Unrted Natrons
73 Contrary to general expcctatron, thcre uas
no massive Serb exodus before the enclave uas
handed over to the Croatran Govemment. Out of
150 000 Serbs present in Eastem Slavonia at the
end of 1995, only 50 000 have lefte. On the
other hand, only, y.n, fcrv of the 80 000 Croats
{ F"*"r*l Ttmes.27 Januan, 1998
e Le Monde.16 January I99d
expelled in l99l have comc back to thcrr ongrnal
homes. Among thc rcasons for thrs cxtreme re-
Iuctance to return arc thc drsastrous economrc
situation rn the reglon u'rth the unemployment
rate behveen 80 and 90o/o- very slorv reconstruc-
tron u'ork wrth only 1000 homes repaired out of a
total of 40 000 declared ravaged and contrnumg
animosity betrveen thc cthnrc communities
74. The office of the United Nations Hrgh
Commissioner for Rcfugees (UNHCR) has been
managing a trvo-w'a1' florv of drsplaccd Croats
going back to Eastern Slavonia and Serbs return-
rng to Westem Slavonia
75. The Governmcnt of Croatia and local ad-
minrstratrons have so far follori'ed through on
promlses to cstabhsh polrce, ludrcrarl' and edu-
catronal svstems u'hrch reflect the pre-rvar multi-
ethnic composltlon of the populatron The re-
gronal pohce force rs more or less splrt rn half
betu'cen Serbian and Croatian officers Judrcral
appointments have also been drvrded benveen
Serbian and Croatran legal authorrtres School
books urll be avarlable rn both the Cl,rrlhc and
Latrn alphabets Approximately 40o/o of public
sectorjobs have been rcserved for Scrbs
76 At the begrnnrng of February 1998, thc
Croatian Government annulled a decree rvhich
enabled Croat refugees to evict Serb occupants
from state-ouned apartmcnts ln Eastern Slavonra
lvhich the Croats occupred before the war
77 The latest neu's from Eastern Slavonra.
horvever, ls not encouraglng Rehef agencres and
thc OSCE are porntrng out that Serbs are berng
drrl'en out piecemeal because of harassment and
adminrstratrve ethnic cleansmg. It rs reported
that about half the Serbs livrng rn Eastern
Slavonra t$'o years ago have norr left shrle the
number of deparnrres rs risrng darlv
78 Accordrng to the UN High Commrssroncr
for Refugees, at lcast 25 000 ethnrc Serbs from
the region are no$' rn the FRY, u'hrle thousands
more have gone to Rcpubhka Srpskal0
79 An address dclivered by Presrdent Franlo
Tud.;man to the fourth congress of his polrtrcal
parly,HDZ, on 2I Februarl' 1998. caused con-
cern rn man)' organrsatrons and countries u,hich
have an mterest rn the rmplementatron of thc
Dalton Agreement In that address, Presrdcnt
u' nw*noral Heralcl Trtbune.20 March 1998
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Tudjman stated hrs opposrtron to all foreign
"rnterfercnce" in hrs country's rnternal affarrs.
He also confirmed hrs policy to defend the
"existential rrghts" of Croats in Bosnia and
Herzegovrna and even hinted that borders would
be challenged.
80. The Bntish Presidencl' of the European
Council, reacting in a statement rssued on
26 February, stated that the Croatian President's
remarks cast "serious doubt upon Croatra's
commrtment to the terntonal integrity of Bosnia
and Herzegovma and rts wrlhngness to mclude
ethnic Serbs and other minorities as full and
equal members of the Croatian society."
81. The North Atlantic Council, in a declara-
tion of 5 March, called on Croatia to promote
and allow the return of refugees and drsplaced
persons to their places of origrn in Croatia and
throughout the region It also reminded Croatra
of rts obhgatrons under the Dalton Agrecment
"the respect of u'hich rvill be crrtical for the de-
velopment of relations betw'een NATO and
Croatia".
7. SFOR and its successor force
82 There cannot be the shghtest doubt that the
presence of foreign military troops in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, initrallv rn IFOR and from 20 Dec-
ember 1996 rn SFOR, has been vrtal for keeprng
the fragile peace and rndrspensable for helprng to
implement the Davton Peace Agreement Vrr-
tualll' all the states with an interest rn lastrng
peace in Bosnra and Herzegovma and rvhich are
also particrpatrng rn the present SFOR had come
to thc conclusron at an earh' stage that a contln-
ued forergn mrlitary presence rvould be necded
after June 1998.
83. The essence ofthe prevalhng oplnlon can
be found in the conclusions of the Peace Imple-
mentatron Conference rn Borur on 9-I0 December
1997, rvhere it was stated:
"The Councrl thanked SFOR for providrng
the secure environment necessan' for the
civrlian rmplementatron of the Peace
Agreement and for the rncreased assistancc
rendered in thrs ficld. The Council recog-
nised and supported the emergrng consen-
sus on the necd for a mrlrtary presence to
continue beyond June I998, considenng it
indispensable for the marntenance of a
stable secunty envrronment and, ln par-
trcular. for helping crcate secure condr-
trons for the conduct by'the Hrgh Reprc-
sentatrve, as wcll as by the UN, OSCE and
other rntcrnatronal organisations, of tasks
assocrated u,rth the Peace Agreement
The Councrl stressed that the presence of
IFOR and SFOR has been the grcatest
singlc contnbutor to sub-regional secuntv
since the signrng of the Peace Agreement
and u'ill continue to be in the short to
medium term. It wclcomed NATO's plans
to consider options for a multrnational
follorv-on force to SFOR beyond June
1998. The Councrl stated that any follow-
on force should provrde appropnatc sup-
port to civrl rmplementation while berng
readill' available and effective enough to
respond quickll,to events on the ground rn
and across Bosnia and Herzegovina "
84. In November 1997. the High Representa-
trve in Bosnra, Carlos Westendorp, had already'
declared that it u'ould take at least tlvo or three
1'ears before foreign troops would no longer be
needed rn Bosnia On the 26th of that same
month, the mrlrtary authorities of NATO's Per-
manent Council submitted a report on SFOR's
operations over the first 12 months of its man-
date, mcludmg an anall'srs of the current sttua-
tron on the ground and the tasks yet to be ac-
comphshed
85 At that trme. the Charrman of NATO's
Militan, Commrttee descrrbed the situatron m
Bosnia as strll "fragrle" and "unpredrctable" u'rth
very, 51ot ' progress and the strategrc goals of the
Bosnian partres differing It rvas also sard that
the peace process could collapse in the absence
of a prolonged military presence. One month
later, on 16 December 1997, NATO's Foretgn
Ministers, meetrng in thc framework of the North
Atlantic Councrl in Brussels, approved the polrt-
rco-militar-r' drrectrve on the options for a post-
SFOR force m Bosnia.
86 The NATO Councrl's directive mentioned
among other things the desire for the forces to be
concentrated tn sensrtrve areas. Any reductrons
in current forces should be proportional for all
contnbutors In thc case of reducttons, there was
to be a more flexrblc and mobrle concept of oper-
atlons
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87 Four drffcrent optlons vnere consrdered for
the successor forcc
(o) total u'rthdrau,al of all forergn troops
u'rth no follow-up force,
(b) a purely' deterrent force which rs
mainlv deplol,ed outsrde Bosnra and
smaller m number,
@ a deterrent force of 20 000 to 25 000
men rvrth more muscle-pou'er on the
ground;
(d) keeprng the force at the current level
of SFOR rvrth a slight reduction to some
30 000 men until after the general elec-
trons rn Bosnia in September 1998
88 It rs to be noted that rn the decrsion-mak-
tng procedure for the SFOR successor force, rt rs
the plannrng staff of SACEUR that drafts thc
options These opuons are examined b1,
NATO's Militarl' Commrttee u'hrch presents a
memorandum u'ith its own recommcndations to
NATO's Permanent Counctl u'hich takes the
final decrsron. Inrtrallv. SACEUR had set I Ma1'
1998 for a decrsron
89 Unrted States authoritres also brought nerv
elemcnts to the discussron. rn partrcular regard-
rng police forces
90 At the NATO Councrl meetmg on 16 Dec-
cmber 1997, the US SecretarJ, of State. Mad-
elerne Albnght, called on Europcans to shouldcr
more of the cost of trarnrng and equrpprng the
pohce rn Bosnra and Herzegovrna She sard that
the flexibrlity of SFOR could be rncreased if
Europeans took on morc tasks of the IPTF bl'
deplolrng milrtary pohce such as the French
Gendarmes or the Italian Carabinlen Secretan'
Albnght u'ondered s'hv thc US had provrded
90Yo of the funds for trainrng and cqurpping of
the Bosnran pohce rvhen the marntenance of lail'
and order rs vrtal to an1'u'ithdrawal stratcg),
91. Defence Secretarv Wrlllam Cohen empha-
srsed that any, NATO mrlitary involvement be-
1,ond June 1998 should include a gradual shrft of
secunty responsibrlrtres from regular soldrers to a
strcngthcned internatronal polrce force rn u'hrch
Europc should assume a greater share
92 The IPTF, many argue. rs hemmed in by, a
ueak mandate and faulty tIN recrurtrng proce-
durcs The nelv lnternatlonal pohce force should
fill the gap bct*'cen armcd NATO soldrers and
unarmed pohce trarncrs It has been suggestcd
that the armed pohce should first rvork alongsrde
NATO troops As ther. gro\\'ln number and the
secuntl' rssues in Bosnra bccome mcrcasinglr.
crvrhan in nature, thc1, could eventually replace
NATO forces.
93. US Senator Bidenu has even proposed that
the Europeans organlse a u'ell-armed paramih-
tary pohce force u'hich uould enablc the bulk of
foreign mrlitary troops to shrft therr mrssron from
patrolhng the boundan' lines betrveen the trvo
Entitres to sccurrng the countnes' rnternational
borders
94 SFOR has found rtself ovenrhelmed by'
crvil tasks such as supcrvrsing elcctlons and
helprng rcsettle rcfugecs. because there has not
been anv support provrdcd bv the UN and the
other rnternalonal organrsatrons that rvere sup-
posed to carn' out thosc lobs
95 The US Defence Secretan,. William
Cohen. pointed out that the US rs contnbutrng
five to srx times as manv poirce offrcers to IPTF
as anv other countn'.
96. In drscussrons urth Javrer Solana, the UN
Secretan-Gcneral's Specral Envov for Bosrua,
Elisabeth Rehn. has pleaded m favour of the
IPTF bcrng allou-ed to contrnue u'rth rts work
Onc of the problems drscussed u'as the coordrna-
tron betu.ecn the IPTF and the mrlrtan,pohce of
thc future post-SFOR A mrlltan'pohcc force of
some 1000 troops mrght not be cnough to ac-
comphsh the tasks cnr,'rsaged. Rctentron of the
IPTF and cooperatron urth the nerv mrlitan'
pohce forcc urll thercfore be neccssan,
97 At rts meetrng rn mrd-Februar1, 1998. the
NATO Councrl drscusscd the possrbrlrtv of sct-
tlng up a Specral Force, responsrble for assumrng
a role of pubhc order maintenance rn Bosnra
Thrs task could take on lncreased rmportance
oncc rcfugees slart to rcturn en mosse u'hrle a
vacuum exrsts betu'ccn the IPTF and SFOR
Another solutron could be a combtnation of drf-
ferent mcasures. rncludrng strengthenrng thc
IPTF. rntcnsrfied trarnrng for the local pohce
forcc and rdcntrfication of SFOR elcments u'rth
expenence in mamtainrng publrc ordcr.
l6
'\ntn rot,onal t{erald'l-nbune. l8 Drcember 1997
DOCTA4ENT 1608
98. On 17 December 1997. the Russian For-
ergn Mrruster, Yevgeny Prrmakov, declared that
Russran troops would partrcrpate rn a SFOR
follow-up force. The next day Presrdent Chnton
announced that he had decided rn prrncrple that
US troops should be part of a NATO-led follow-
on military force in Bosnia. Thc Presrdent made
rt clear, however, that the plan for a successor
force should meet the followrng key crrterra:
the mission "must be achievable" and
tied to "concrete benchmarks, not a
deadline", and must have "clear oblec-
tives that when met will create a self-
sustaining, secure environment and al-
low us to remove our troops",
- 
the force has to be smaller but suffi-
cient in number and in equrpment to
achieve rts mrssron and protect itself rn
safetl',
- 
the United States must retarn command
ofthe force;
- 
the European alhes should assume therr
share of responsibilrty'.
- 
the mrssron's cost must be "man-
ageable",
- 
the plan "must have substantral support
from Congress and the Amencan
people"
The Hrgh Representatrve, Carlos Westendorp.
sard at the begirurrng of Februan' 1998 that the
SFOR follou-up force should remarn rn place for
three more 1,ears
99 On 18 February 1998, NATO's Perma-
nent Council decrded to contlnue its opcratron m
Bosnra after the mandate of the current SFOR
exprred. NATO's Permanent Councrl adopted
the earlier mentioned option (d) v,fih the new
force being more concentrated m certam key
pornts and more mobile. Thrs decrsron rvas based
on the hypothesis that the srtuatron rull rmprove
in Bosnia and that peace will be consolidated. at
the same trme allowing for a gradual transfer of
responsrbilitres to the local authoritres''
100. Until thc elections rn September, the neu'
SFOR u'ill have approxrmatcly the same number
of men (+ 35 000) and thrs r,i'ill then be reduced
to 20 000-25 000 rf the srtuatron allorvs No
\ttonto N'rw.s, 18 Febmary 1998
preclse duration has bcen rncludcd in the man-
date, but the NATO Councrl rvrll undertake a
penodrc revrew of the srtuatlon on the ground
and of the SFOR mlssron every six months. The
reductron betu,een norv and June will notably
affect I 500 US mrlitary personnel.
l0l. Suggestrons made by' the US Government
to include mrlitarl' pohce elements m the new
force was taken on board but the practical detarls
have not yet been stipulated
102 It is knorvn that the United Nations needs
more resources to enable the IPTF to implcment
rts mandate This problem can partly be handled
through specific natronal programmes At the
same time, more pressure should be exerted on
Iocal authorrties to actrvate therr police forces.
SFOR also needs more trainrng to handle civil
unrest in emergencres
103 It u'as also reahsed, horvever. that the
shortcomings rn the present police forces cannot
ahval's be appropnatell, dealt rvith by mlhtar),
forces There are a number of situations in
ri'hrch thrs apphes. in particular civil drstur-
bances u'hrch mav occur rvhen nerv multr-ethnrc
govemments are rnstalled or have therr meetings
or u'hen refugees are returning to minority' areas
For such occasions. specralised unrts, totalling
some 800 troops rrrll be rncorporated into and
come under SFOR command and urll most likell'
be ccntrallv deploi'ed.
104 The statemcnt of the North Atlantic
Councrl of 20 Februan, 1998 mentlons. among
other things. the follorvrng
"The nen' NATO-led multrnatronal force
rvill retaln the u,ell-estabhshed name
SFOR It \\ill have the mrssion to deter
renerved hostilitres and to contribute to a
securc envrronment for the ongorng civil
rmplementatron efforts in order to stabrlise
and consohdatc the peace ln Bosrua and
Herzegovina. It rull have an enhanced
capabilrty to hclp promote public secunty
rn closc cooperatron rvrth the Office of the
Hrgh Representatrve. the UN International
Pohce Task Force and the authontres of
Bosnia and Hcrzcgovina
The force s'rll contrnue to provide broad
support for the rmplementatron of the civil
aspects of the Peace Agreement rncludrng
the promotron of democratrc instrtutions,
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support for OHR, IPTF, UNHCR, OCSE,
ICTY and other internatronal crvrl agen-
cies and assistance rn carrylng out humanr-
tarran tasks As part of a transrtron strat-
egy, the extent of support over trme should
be adapted to developments rn the politrcal
and secunty srtuation and to progress in
the implementation of the crvil elements of
the Peace Agreement rncludrng the autumn
elections in Bosnia and Herzcgovina.
Force levels will therefore be revrewed
Iater thrs year and at regular rntervals u'ith
the arm of achieving both progresslve re-
ductions in the size, role and profile of the
force as part ofthe transition, strategy and
the transfer of responsibilities to the com-
mon mstrtutrons, other civil authorrties, the
UN, the Hrgh Representative. the OSCE
and other mternational organrsatrons as
appropriatc."
105 SACEUR and NATO military authorrtres
are no\\ preparing an OPLAN (Operatronal Plan)
to be examrned b1' the Permanent Councrl to-
u'ards the end of April, in consultatron wrth the
other contrrbuting natlons SHAPE u'orks rvrth
other contrrbutors through the Coordrnatron Cell
Command and rules of engagement u'rll be com-
parable to the current force, as urll milrtary. ar-
rangcments for rncorporatron of Russian forces
106 The marn activity for the nerl SFOR rs to
prevent a resumption of hostilrtres and matntaln
the broad support necessan, for crvrl rmplemen-
tatron Key military tasks rvrll rnclude malntaln-
rng a deterrent presence in the countrl'and con-
tnbutrng, rn a srmrlar manner to SFOR's current
approach, to a secure environment in u'hrch the
lnternatronal commurutv cuul implement the
Peace Agrcement, Key supporting tasks rnclude
providrng, on a case-by-case basrs. support to the
Hrgh Representative and other prrncrpal crvrl or-
ganrsations. at the LINHCR thrs urll entarl pro-
motrng phased and orderll' returns of refugees
and displaced persons, at the OHR (Office of the
Hrgh Representatrve) and OSCE rt urll rnvolve
the monrtoring of electrons and rnstallation of
elected officials, as well as reform of the medra;
at the IPTF (lnternational Pohce Task Force)
there wrll need to be efforts drrectcd touards
creatlng a reformed and restructured local pohce,
but rvrthout undertaking civil poiice tasks. the
ICTY rvrll havc to continue its u'ork conccrning
war crrminals, rmplementrng vigorously the cur-
rent pohcy on therr detentlonrs.
107 SACEUR is nou, cxpected to present its
OPLAN to NATO's Mrlrtary Commrttee on
20 April The composrtron of SFOR urll be
changed shghtly The Unrted States will reduce
rts contrngent from 8 500 to 6 000 troops. The
Malaysian contmgent u'ill be reduced, whrle the
Llkramran contmgent rvrll be mcreased A 500-
strong Belgrar/Luxembourg battalion of mecha-
nrsed rnfantry wrll be added. and both the Euro-
pean Corps and Eurofor rvill partrcrpate.
108 The detarled arrangements for the special-
ised unrt of some 800 military pohce for opera-
tlons to marntarn public order have not 1'et been
defined Ncrthcr havc the unit's tasks, composl-
tron and rts relatrons u'rth SFOR and the IPTF
been decrded I'et Thrs unit. it rvrll be remem-
bcred, was suggested by' the Unrted States rn
order to make the role of the Europeans in SFOR
more visrble and rt rvas to be under the command
of a French natronal Strangely enough, several
European countries have vorced therr oppositron
and it rs expected that Italy' will now provrde the
main part of thrs unit. probably ivrth contnbu-
trons from Sparn and Argentrnara
Parl II: The situation in Kosovo
1. Kosovo
109 In the last Defence Commrttec's report on
Europe's role rn the Balkansr5, lt \l'as porntcd out
clearll that thc srtuatron rn Kosovo u'as deterio-
rating serrouslv Sadl.v. recent vrolence rn that
part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavra has
only confirmed this foreboding
I l0 When rccaprtulatrng developments in
Kosovo, rt should be remembered that Serbs look
on thrs provlnce as the cradle of therr natron. In
the Mrddle Ages. rt rvas from Kosovo that the
Serbs estabhshed therr Balkan emplre u,hich
reached rts prnnacle under Emperor Stefan Dusan
(1308-1355) Before the end of that century.
horvcver. rn I389, the Serbs rvere dcfeated at the
battle of Kosovo Polle b1, the Turks u'ho soon
E.1tlo,',ro i'rws. 25 Febmarv 1998
ta 
-Atlantrc.\eu,s, 9 epnl 1998
ts Europe'.s role tn the pret,entton antl nrunagement of
crtses in lhe Balkans, Rapporteur Mr Blaaul. Assem-
bly Document 1589
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occupred a large part of the Balkans, stayrng
there untrl the l9th century and with varyrng de-
grees of succoss became involved rn disputes and
battles over territory u'rth Austria and Hungary
I I I At the begrnning of the l9th century, the
Serbs started fighting for independence but this
was not recognrsed untrl the Treaty of Berhn u,as
srgned in 1878 After a vrctory over thc Turks in
the first Balkan war, Serbia acqurred Kosovo rn
l9l3
ll2. The Kosovar Albanians consrder them-
sclves to be Illyrians, who have been livrng rn
Kosovo srnce prehrstoric times havmg been con-
quered by the Serbs The Serbs, however, argue
that the Albanrans occupred the Kosovar lands
rvhen, at the end of the lTth century, the vicrssi-
tudes of the war betu'een Austrians and Turks
obliged them to leave their lands in order to settle
rn what ls now Volvodrna.
I 13 Slobodan Mrlosevic started his campargn
for a "greater Serbia" rn 1987 rvith a fiercely
nationalistic speech rn Kosovo Polje, generalll,
considered as the prelude to the war in former
Yugoslavia In 1989, the government rn Bel-
grade stripped Kosovo of its autonomy, guaran-
teed under the Federal Constitution of 1974, dis-
solved the government and assembly and placed
it under martial larv. An estrmated 40-45 000-
strong Serb pohce force rs helping to rule
Kosovo u'rth an iron hand
I 14 Under the leadership of Ibrahrm Rugova,
u'ho organrsed discrplined and non-vrolent resrs-
tance, the Kosovar Albanians set up a shadorv
go!'ernment. schools and chnrcs They collected
therr oun taxcs, and diplomas and certrficates
u-ere rssued b1' the Repubhc of Kosovo whrch is
not an officiallv-rccognised republic
I l5 ln 1992Ibrahrm Rugova was elected b1, an
overu,helming ma.;orrty as Presrdent of the Re-
pubhc of Albanrans rn electrons whrch were con-
sidcred illegal by the govemment rn Belgrade In
recent years, the government in Belgrade has re-
settled in Kosovo some 25 000 Serb refugces
rlho rvere expelled from Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina and other parts of former Yugosla-
via durrng the armed conflict.
116. At the same time, hundreds of thousands
of inhabitants have left Kosovo, some for polrtr-
cal, but most of them for economlc reasons In
Germany alone, some I40 000 Kosovar Alba-
nrans are seeking asylum.
ll7 The economy' in Kosovo rs a disastcr. In
1992, the Albanran leaders decrded to cancel
polrtical and economic cooperatron with the Serb
authorities The officral economy then almost
ceased to exist and what rvas left suffered heavrly
from the economic sanctrons agalnst thc FRY.
Wrth an unemploy,rnent rate of 85oh, an increas-
mg number of people havc to earn money on the
black market and bv smuggling and gunrunning.
The Institute for Economy in Kosovo's capital,
Pristina, calculates income from regular jobs at
not much more than l0%o Albanians abroad are
berng taxed in order to contribute to the functron-
ing and marntenancc of therr "independent"
Kosovar repubhc,
I 18. For a number of vears, Kosovar Albamans
have follox,ed the advrcc of Ibrahim Rugova to
confine themselves to peaceful protests against
Serbia's uncompromtsrng attitude The failure to
rvin concessions from the central government in
Belgrade, combrned u'rth the decision at the
Dayton Peace Agreement negotrations to rgnore
the questron of Kosovo, left Kosovar Albanrans
increasrngly frustrated and thrs has resulted in
more radrcal claims
ll9 At the begrnning, Albanians had hoped to
regain therr provrncral autonomv Nou., rt is re-
ported that thev arc clamounng for the estab-
lishment of a Republic of Kosovo rvrthrn the Fed-
eral Repubhc of Yugoslavla, on an equal footrng
u'ith the Repubhc of Serbra and the Repubhc of
Montenegro, but accordrng to many othcr Alba-
ntans the only solutron rs a completely independ-
ent repubhc or integration rnto Albania
120. In 1996, the UQK (Ushtrra Qlirrmatare e
Kosovas. or Kosovo Lrberatron A*y) started
mountmg terrorrst operatlons, rncluding not onl),
attacks on Serb pohce officers and civihans but
also on Albanians u'ho rvcre accused of collabo-
rating ri'ith Serbs.
l2l Srnce rt surfaced rn August 1996, the
UQK has clarmed responsrbrlrtl, for the killing of
more than 50 people It is not knorm horv many
people belong to this shadowy' orgarusatron but
rnformed guesses do not exceed hundreds. Some
of rts members take advantage of therr traming rn
thc armed forces of former Yugoslavra.
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122 Also in 1996, Presrdent Slobodan Mrlo-
sevrc and Ibrahrm Rugova concluded an agree-
ment under which the Kosovar Albanians could
contlnue to bc educated rn thetr own language
When the agreement was not implemented, Mr
Rugova, confronted rvith diminishing support for
hrs moderate pohcy, had no other choice than to
make his demands more radical.
123. Manv countrres recomrnended the govern-
ment m Belgrade to adopt a more flexible attrtude
on thrs rssue, but Presrdent Mrlosevic persisted in
his view that Kosovo is an rntcrnal affair for
u,hrch no outside medration can be accepted A
ma;ontv of Serbs support President Mtlosevtc's
opmlon that no concessions can be made to grant
Kosovo a form of autonomy because this prov-
ince rs the heartland of Serbra's earll' history and
rs also the site of most of rts rmportant reltgtous
monuments. This drd not prevent Presrdent Milo-
sevic on 4November 1997 from agreerng u'ith
the Albanian Prestdent, Fatos Nano, to consult
closely, on the future of Kosovo
124. At the end of November 1997, the Forergn
Mmrsters of France and Germany exhorted the
polrtrcal leaders of Serbian and Kosovar Alba-
nrans to start a dralogue about Kosovo's future.
In December 1997, Bu.;ar Bukosh, Prrme Minrs-
ter of the self-proclarmed "Republic of Kosovo"
dcclared that the Kosovar Albanian leaders had
to abandon therr ''extreme passrvity" because
that rvas "utoprc''r6
I25 This neu, radrcalism among Albanians rn
turn provoked a more extreme attrtude on the
part of the Serb and Montenegnn mtnoritl' tn
Kosovo, w'hose leader, Bogdan Kecman, pubhcll'
rncited hrs comrades to takc up arrns in order to
hberate themselves from the "Albanran terror-
IStS.,
126 In thrs atmosphere of mounttng unrest,
accompanied b1' an increasrng number of terror-
rst acts, man)' governments and rntemational or-
ganrsatrons, concerned by the sttuation tn the
Balkans, repeatedly called for dralogue betu'ecn
the government in Belgrade and the Kosovar Al-
banrans rn order to resolve the problems rn
Kosovo.
127 A Contact Group meettngrT tn Moscou' on
25 Februan' 1998 rssued a statemcnt on Kosovo.
confirmmg rts carhcr posrtron expressed rn thc
Ncw York Declaratron of Forergn Mrnrsters of
24 September l99l as ucll as tn the Washrngton
Contact Group Dcclaratron of 8 Januarl' I998.
In thesc statements, the Contact Group outllned
rts pnnciples for a mutuallr' acceptable solutron
for Kosovo rvrthin the Fedcral Repubhc of
Yugoslavra (FRY)
128 Among other thrngs. rt dcclared the follow-
rng rn its Moscorv statement
"The Contact Group agreed that both srdes
should be reasonable and flexrble and
focus on immedrate steps to reduce ten-
slons 
- 
bearrng rn mrnd the overrtdtng necd
to avord conflrct and vrolencc It ex-
pressed contrnurng support for full and
raprd rmplementatron of the Educatron
Agrcement. recognlsrng its rmportance as a
step for the promotron of stabrlitv rn thc
region It called on thc authontres rn Bel-
grade and leadershrp of thc Kosovar Al-
banran cornmunlt)' to enter u,ithout pre-
conditrons into a full and constructivc
dralogue to deal wrth thc underlf ing soctal,
economrc and status problems
The Contact Group rerterated that rt sup-
ported nerthcr rndependence nor the matn-
tenancc of the .\tctltts Eto The pnnctples
of the solutron of the Kosovo problem
should be based on the terntortal lntegntv
of the Fedcral Republic of Yugoslavra.
taking rnto account the rrghts of the
Kosovar Albanians and all those uho hve
in Kosovo rn accordance u'tth OSCE stan-
dards. Helsrnkr pnncrplcs and the UN
Charter. Thc Contact Group supports an
enhanced status for Kosovo u'tthtn the
FRY and recognlscs that thrs must rncludc
meanrngfu I sclf-admrnrstratlon
The Contact Group reiterated thetr vteu
that the FRY needs to address thrs ques-
tron urgentlv. and that makrng progress to
rftr. tnt..nulronal Contact Group u'as set up rn Apnl
199-1 rn order to coordrnate thc pohq' of the countncs
concerned regardrng the sltuatron in Bosrua and
Herzegovrna The Contact Group countnes are France.
Germanl', Italy. Russra. the Uruted Krngdom and the
Uruted StatesWC Jr o n d n I s b I a d, l'7 January' I 998
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resolve thc serrous polrtrcal and human
rrghts issucs in Kosovo rs cntrcal for Bel-
gradc to lmpro\.e rts international posrtron
and rclatrons rvrth the rnternatronal com-
munrty. The Contact Group expressed rts
readiness to facrlrtatc dralogue "
129 Aftcr a long perrod of gror,r'rng tcnslon
betrveen Albanrans and Scrbs rn Kosovo, vro-
lencc erupted on 28 Fcbruary 1998 rvhcn, ac-
cording to offrcral statements. masked rebels of
the Kosovo Lrberatron Army attacked a pohce
patrol near the vrllagc of Lrkosane rn central
Kosol'o, kilhng trvo policcmen Frvc rebcls were
krllcd by the pohce Pohce remforcements. sup-
ported bi, hehcopters and armoured pcrsonnel
carners, scaled off the Drcnrca area u'hcrc the
KLA has estabhshed bases rn order to crack
dosn on the gucrnlla fighters Dunng thrs oper-
atlon at least l4 Albanrans. rncludrng u'omen and
chrldren. and four Scrb pohcemcn \\'cre rcport-
cdll,krlled
130 On 2 March, a mass demonstration of Al-
banrans rn Kosovo's caprtal Pnstina agarnst the
action of the Serb pohce agarn led to clashes
betu'een dcmonstrators and thc pohce, leavrng
about 300 u'ounded and one killed
l3l On 5 March. the Serb pohcc carned out
another "retahatory, actron" rn ethnrc Albanian
rrllages rn u'hrch. accordrng to the Interior Mrnrs-
tn'. ''20 terrorists" and tu'o pohcemen u'ere krllcd
rn thc Drenrca regron After further operatlons
on 6 March. the Serbran pohce declarcd that rt
had '-dcstroved the corc" of the KLA. krlhng
guernlla leadcr Adem Jasarr
132 On 8 March, the Serb dcputv chref of
Kosovo Provrncc. Vel.lko Odalevrc. declared that
''the operatron to hqurdate the heart of Kosovo
terronsm has ended" Altogether, the evcnts that
took place earlv rn March rcsultcd rn at least 80
fatalrtres
133 On 4 March. the US specral envo)', Robert
Gelbard. threatened Presrdent Mrlosevic r.rrth
military rnterventron rn thc event of a conflict rn
Bosnra He condemned thc KLA's "terrorism"
but sard that the Serbs had an "ovcnvhelmrng"
responsrbrlitv for thc crrsis rn Kosovo,
134 The Bntish Forcrgn Secrctarv, Robrn
Cook, represcntlng thc EU Presrdencr'. told
Prcsrdcnt Mrlosevrc on 5 March to re-cstabhsh
Kosovo's provrncral autonomy and to rmplement
the 1996 agrcemcnt on rcrntcgratron of the Al-
banrans rn Kosovo's cducatronal system At the
samc tlme, he declared that the EU u'as opposed
to sccessron or full rndepcndcnce for Kosovo
13-5 In a statement on 6 March 1998, the
Presrdent of thc WEU Asscmbly said that the
cvents in Kosovo constrtutcd a thrcat to mterna-
tronal peacc tvrthrn thc mcanrng of Artrclc VIII of
the modificd Brusscls Trcaty
136 Also on 6 March 1998. the Gcrman For-
ergn Minrster, Klaus Krnkel, called among other
thrngs for a continucd prcsence of I-INPREDEP
rn FYROM and for a rernforcement of WEU's
MAPE mrssion rn Albania
137 The Unrted Statcs rvrthdreu four conces-
srons recentll'granted to the FRY to rervard rt for
rts coopcratton tn thc rmplcmentatton of the
Dar4on Agrcement Thesc conccsstons were
landrng rrghts for Yugoslav arrhnes. a hftrng of
thc cerhng on thc number of Serb drplomats at
the Unrted Natrons. thc openrng of a Yugoslai.'
consulate rn the Unrted States and an lnvltatlon to
lorn thc Southern European Cooperation Initia-
ttvel8
138 Also on 6 March, the Russran Foreign
N{rnrstn' rssued a statemcnt rn u'hrch lt con-
demncd any, forergn lntencntlon rn the conflrct rn
Kosovo as "unacccptable" It also rnvrted the
rnternational communrtv to find a solution to thc
problcm under stnct observancc of the terntonal
intcgrrtv of thc FRY
I39 Russra's attrtudc has bocn explained u'rth
rcfcrencc to the rehgrous and cthnrc background
shared bv Russrans and Serbs Another lmpor-
tant reason for Russra's behar,rour mav be rts
dctcrmrnatron to shou' rts independcnce rn rnter-
natronal polrtrcs rvhere the Unrted States rs trying
to rmposc itself as the unchallenged leadcr
2. Reactions of internotionol and
s u pran ation al orgonisation s
140 All the ncrghbourmg countrles, and also
the Unrted States. Russra. the EU. WEU, NATO
and the OSCE expressed therr fear that thc ex-
plosrve situatron m Kosovo could escalate and
Iead to a Bosnra-lfte conflrct. spreadrng to other
coulltrles rn thc reglon Thcrc s'erc numcrous
calls for dralogue betx'ccn the governmcnt m
Belgrade and thc Kosovar Albanrans
'" t,rtrrronoral I{erald 7"nbune,6 March 1998
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I4l On 9 March, the Foreign Minrsters of thc
Contact Group countnes mct tn London in order
to drscuss the actton to be taken tn the crists in
Kosovo Russta, supportlng Mr Milosevic's
claim that Kosovo ts an internal matter, was rep-
resented by the Deputy Foreign Mtntster, Nikolal
Afanasjenko. In rts statement, the Coniact Group
condemned "the use of exccsslve force by Ser-
bran pohce agatnst civihans and against peaceful
demonstrators in Pristina on 2 March" At the
same trme, it condemned "terrorist actions by the
Kosovo Lrberation Army' or an1, s1ll.t groups or
indrviduals" It called on the Kosovar Albanians
to make rt clear that they abhorred terrorism and
msrsted that ''those outsrde the FRY who are
supplyrng finance, arrns or tratrung for terrorist
actrvrtf in Kosovo should rmmedrately cease
dorng so".
142 The Contact Group condemned the "large-
scale pohce actrons .. that further rnflamed an
alreadl' volatrle situatton" u'hich rt consldered
u'ere "disproporttonate methods of control". In
rts opinlon, "government authonttes have a spe-
cral responsrbilrty to protect the human or civil
nghts of all citrzens and to ensure that public
secuntv forces act judiciously and rvith re-
strarnt"
143 The Contact Group then took rvide-rang-
mg actrons to address the crtsts Among other
thrngs. this rncluded
- 
a rcquest for a misston to Kosovo bv
the Unrted Nattons Hrgh Commlssioner
for Human Rrghts.
- 
support for the proposal for a new
mrssron for Fehpe Gonzalez as the Per-
sonal Representative of the OSCE
Charrman-rn-Office for the FRY that
u'ould tnclude a new and specific man-
date for addressrng the problems rn
Kosovo.
- 
support for the rcturn of the OSCE
long-term mlsslons to Kosovo, the
Sandjak and Vo.;vodrna;
- 
support for Sant'Egrdio's efforts to se-
cure rmplementatlon of the Education
Agreement;
- 
a rccommcndatton that consideration be
glven to adaptrng the current
LINPREDEP mandatc. w'rth support for
the marntenance of an internattonal
mrlrtary' presence on the ground rn the
Former Yugoslav Rcpubhc of Macc-
donra u'hen the current mandate of
LINPREDEP cxprres
144 In order to force the FRY to take actron.
the Contact Group cndorsed the follorving meas-
ures to be pursued rmmcdrately
I LIN Securitl' Counctl consideratton of a
comprehenslve alrns embargo agarnst thc
FRY, including Kosovo.
2. Refusal to supply' equrpment to the
FRY u'hrch mrght be used for tnternal re-
presslon, or for tcrrorism:
3 Dcnral of vtsas for senior FRY and
Serbran reprcscntattves responstble for re-
pressrve actlon by' FRY secuntv forces m
Kosovo;
4 A moratorium on govemment-financed
export credrt support for trade and invest-
ment. rncluding government financtng for
prtvattsation, rn Scrbia
145 Thc Russian Federation drd not agree that
the measures under 3 and 4 should be rmposcd
immedrately
146 Thc Contact Group further called upon
Presrdent Milosevlc to take raprd and effecttve
steps to stop the violence and engagc rn a com-
mltment to find a polrtrcal solutton to the Kosovo
problcm through dralogue Specrficalll'. he
should u rthrn ten dar s
- 
rvrthdrau' the spectal pohce untts and
ceasc actton by thc securttv forces af-
fecting the crvrhan populatron,
- 
allorv access to Kosovo for thc ICRC
and other humanltanan organlsations
as rvell as bv representatlves of thc
Contact Group and other embasstes.
- 
commrt hrmself pubhcl,r' to begin a
process of dralogue u'ith the leadershrp
of the Kosovar Albanian commuruty;
- 
cooperate m a constructlve manncr
urth the Contact Group rn the rmple-
mentatlon of thc actrons they specified
u'hrch requrred actton b1' the FRY
Government
22
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147. A new meetrng of the Contact Group to
assess the response of the Govemment of the
FRY was to take place on 25 March
148 Frnally, as regards the core rssue rnvolved,
it made the followrng statement.
"We support neither independence nor the
mamtenance of the status quo As rve have
set out clearly, the principles for a soluilon
of the Kosovo problem should based on
the territorial integrity of the Federal Re-
pubhc of Yugoslavia, and be in accor-
dance wrth OSCE standards, Helsrnkr
princrples, and the UN Charter Such a
solution also must take rnto account the
rights of the Kosovar Albanrans and all
those u'ho hve m Kosovo We support an
enhanced status for Kosovo wrthrn the
FRY rvhich a substantrallv greater degree
of autonomv would bnng and recogruse
that thrs must tnclude meamngful self-
determinatron.
The u'ay' to defeat terrorism rn Kosovo is
for Belgrade to offer the Kosovar Alba-
nlan corrrmunrtv a genuine polrtical pro-
ccss. The authorities rn Belgrade and the
Ieadershrp of the Kosovar Albanian com-
munitl' must assume their responsrbilrtv to
enter u'ithout preconditrons rnto a mean-
rngful dralogue on polrtrcal status issues,
The Contact Group stands ready to facrh-
tate such a dralogue "
149. On l0 March, the Secretarl'-General of
WEU, Jose Cutrlerro, declared
"WEU ls extremely concerned bv the
srtuatron rn Kosovo, Federal Repubhc of
Yugoslavra (FRY), rn hght of the deplor-
able vrolence m recent davs
Toda-"- the Councrl heard reports on recent
EU and NATO activrtres as ri'ell as on thc
Contact Group meetmg held rn London on
9 March WEU supports all efforts to
bring an end to acts of represslon rn
Kosovo, condemns terronsm and calls for
a peaceful dialogue betrveen the authorrtres
rn Belgrade and the leadershrp of the
Kosovar Albanran communrtv
WEU wrll continue to monrtor the srtua-
tion closell' "
150 On l2 March, the European Conference, a
first summrt meetrng of the heads of state and of
government of thc l5 EU members and of the I I
candidates for acccsston. supported earher dec-
larations on Kosovo made by internatronal bodies
and gatherings and rssued a statement to empha-
sise its determrnatron to play a full part in rnter-
natronal efforts to promote a solution to the
Kosovo cnsis Among other things rt was stated:
"Such a solutron should be based on the
territorral rntegrrty of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavra, and be m accordance urth
OSCE standards, Helsinkr principles, and
the IIN Charter. It must also take rnto ac-
count the nghts of the Kosovar Albanrans
and all thosc uho hve in Kosovo The EU
supports an cnhanced status for Kosovo
withrn the Federal Repubhc of Yugoslavra
Thcy' see no prospect of the development
of anv aspcct of the EU's relatrons rvith
the FRY, rncludrng trade measures, unless
Belgrade's approach to the Kosovo cnsrs
changes to an emphasrs on dralogue and a
polrtrcal solutron. They call on the Bel-
grade authorrtres and the Kosovar Alba-
nran leadershrp to take a constructrve ap-
proach rn a genuine dialogue "
3. The common position of
the European Union and the second
Contact Group meeting on Kosovo
l5l. Follorrrng the declaratron of the European
Conference on l2 March and the drscussrons at
the informal meeting of thc Minrsters of Foreign
Affarrs of the EU rn Edrnburgh on 13 and 14
March 1998, the European Union issued rts
common posltlon on restrrctrve measurcs against
the Federal Repubhc of Yugoslavra.
152 The declaratron noted that the use of force
agarnst the Kosovar Albanian communrtl' rn
Kosovo constrtuted an unacceptable vrolatron of
human nghts, endangcrrng securit-r,' rn the regron
The EU decrdcd to rmpose the follou,rng sanc-
tions
" 1. The embargo on arrns exports to the
former Yugoslavra estabhshed rn I996 is
confirmed
2 No equipmcnt u,htch mrght be used
for rntemal rspresslon or for terrorrsm wtll
be supphed to the FRY.
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3. A moratonum rvill be implemented on
govcrnment-financed export crcdrt support
for trade and rnvcstment, including gov-
ernment financing for prrvattsatlons, ln
Serbra
4 No visas shall be rssued for senror
FRY and Serbian representatrves res-
ponsible for repressrve actron by FRY
secunty forces in Kosovo."
153 The EU's declaratron also noted clearly
u,hat the FRY rvas cxpected to do. statrng the
following
"The sanctrons set out in the Common
Posrtion rvill be reconsrdered rmmedrately
rf the Govemment of the FRY takes
effecttve steps to stop the vrolence and
engage rn a commrtment to find a politrcal
solutron to the rssue of Kosovo through a
peaceful draiogue rvrth the Kosovar
Albanran Communrtl,, rn partrcular by.
ivithdraurng the special pohce unrts and
ceasmg actlon by the secunty forces
affectrng the crvrhan populatron, allorvrng
access to Kosovo for thc Internatronal
Commrftee of the Red Cross and other
humanrtanan organrsations as rvell as bv
represcntatlves of the EU and other embas-
sies. commrttrng itself pubhcll' to begin a
process of dralogue w'ith thc leadershrp of
the Kosovar Albanran Communrtr'. coop-
eratlng rn a constructlve manner rn order
to rmplcment the actron set out rn the
Contact Group statement. Farhng progress
on these pornts, further measures 
- 
and m
partrcular a freeze on the funds held
abroad b), thc FRY and Serbran
Governments 
- 
rvould be taken "
I54 The European Council finallv appornted
Felrpe Gonzalez as Specral Representatrve of thc
EU for thc problems m the FRY rncludrng
Kosovo, recognrsmg that Mr Gonzalez had al-
ready been nommated Specral Representative of
the actrng Presrdent of the OSCE Councrl for the
FRY
155 As alreadl,mentroned above. at rts London
meetlng on 9 March, the Contact Group had
agreed to meet again on 25 March to revrcu, dev-
elopments rn Kosovo and to follorv up decrstons
reached at the London mceting
156 Mr Mrlosevrc. an old hand at thrs krnd of
gamc. had been makrng enough concesslons to
drvrde hrs crrtrcs rn the Contact Group He had
ordered thc Bosnran Serb Presrdent, Milan
Milutrnovrc, to go to Pristrna for negotiations on
certam condrtrons and he had allowed peaceful
demonstrations rvhrle the special police units
stopped therr operations against Albanians On
23 March, Serbs and Kosovar Albanians also
reached an agrcement on a separate, but equal
educational svstem But on 24 March there u'ere
renewed clashes between Albanians and Serbian
police unrts rvith one policeman and trvo Alba-
nrans killed. To put it clcarly, the specral pohce
units had not been rvithdrawn and Mr Mrlosevic
had not committed himsclf to begin an uncondr-
tional dralogue rvrth the leadershrp of the
Kosovar Albanran community, as the Contact
Group had demanded at rts 9 March meetrng ln
London
157. In preparatron for the meeting on 25
March. manv drscussrons took place betrveen thc
governments concerned and Belgrade sa\\' a se-
quence of drplomatic vrslts and approaches rvhich
rs usual under such crrcumstances
158. Vrsiting Belgrade on l7 March, Russra's
Forergn Minrstcr, Yevgeny Primakov, declared
that Russia starts from trvo princrples rvhen ad-
dressmg rssues of natronal mrnorities "the prin-
crple of territorral integnty rn the resolutron of
rssues rvithin a ccrtaln state, and grantrng u'rder
self-government nghts "
159. On the othcr hand, Russia u,as strll block-
rng the adoptron of a UN resolutron on an arrns
embargo against thc FRY rvhich s'ould suspend a
US$ I 5 brlhon dcal for heaw rveapons uhrch
had earher been concluded betu'een Russra and
the FRY
160. On 19 March, the Foreign Mrnisters of
France and Germany, Mr Vednne and Mr
Kinkel. u'ent to Belgrade to make a last-drtch
cffort to persuade Presrdent Mrlosevic to meet
the conditions set bv the Contact Group rn rts
London meetrng After their meetings ivrth
Prcsident Mrlosevrc and rvlth the Bosnran Serb
President, Mr Mrlutrnovrc. the Mrrusters stated
that substantial progrcss had been made rn drs-
cussions in Belgrade armed at endrng pohce at-
tacks on Kosovar Albanrans Minister Krnkel
rvas quoted as saying that "The demands rve
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made have, generallv speakrng, bcen mctre" On
that same day, Italy and Russra suggested that
they would oppose takrng the hardest hne against
Belgrade Only the Unrted Krngdom and the
Unrted States had pushed consistently for tough
actron
l6l . Most Western European governments have
been reluctant in therr reprisals agarnst Presrdent
Milosevic, because of therr fear that a tough
policy tou,ards the government rn Belgrade would
only play into the hands of the ultra-natronahst
Volrslav Seselj, u,ho came close to ivinning the
Serbian presidential election in 1997
162. The mcetmg of the Contact Group on 25
March in Bonn finally, resulted in a one-month
cxtenslon of the carlier ultrmatum to Presrdent
Milosevic. The exrsilng sanctions, an embargo
on equipment for rnternal repressron, a freeze on
export subsidres for trade and rnvestment rn the
FRY and a vlsa rnterdrctron for Yugoslavran
authoritres responsrble for the vrolence in
Kosovo, u'ere maintained and pledges rvere made
by'all, rncluding Russra, to adopt a \\.eapons em-
bargo rn the UN Securrty, Councrl
163 In its statement. the Contact Group m-
srsted that ''an urgent start be made to thc pro-
cess of unconditional dialogue with the
leadershrp of the Kosovar Albanran communitr,.
rnvolvrng federal and repubhc levels of
goverrunent" It further consrdered that "srnce rts
meetmg rn London, there has been progress rn
some areas of concern, notably somc movsment
rn Belgrade's posltlon on dralogue on a range of
issues rncludrng the autonomv of Kosovo and the
conclusron of the long-overdue agreement on
implementatron of the educatron accord"
164 Its overall assessment was that ''further
progress by, Belgrade on certaln points tn para-
graphs 6 andT of the London statement rgqurrmg
action b1, the FRY and Serbran governments is
necessar), Therefore we havc agreed to maintain
and implement the measures announced on
9 March, rncluding seekrng adoptron by 3l
March of the arms embargo resolutron currentlv
under consrderation in the UN Securrtv Councrl"
165 The Contact Group agreed to meet agarn
in four weeks trme to reassess the srtuatron It
argued that "if President Mrlosevtc takcs the
E P,norr*t Ttmes. 2OMarch I998
steps specrfied rn London. ue u,ill reconsrder cx-
rstrng measures includrng actlon rn the SecurrtY
Councrl to terminate thc arms embargo"
166 President Mrlosevic r.vas urgcd "to coop-
erate fully u,ith the mrssion of Mr Fehpe Gon-
zalez. a personal representative of the OSCE
Charrman-in-Offrce and EU Special Representa-
tlve"
167. Thc Contact Group reaffirmed rts ''strong
oppositron to all terrorist actrons. . This apphes
equally to Serbian pohce and Kosovar Albanian
extremrsts". It welcomcd Mr Rugova's ''clear
commitment to non-vrolence" and urged others in
the leadershrp of the Kosovar Albaman com-
munitl,to "make therr opposrtron to vrolence and
terrorrsm both clear and pubhc"
168 It applauded "the uork of Sant'Egrdo and
of the 3+3 commission rn reachrng agreement on
measures to implement thc 1996 Educatron
agreement".
169 Frnalll,, rt oncc agarn repeated rts funda-
mental posltlon as follou's
''We support nerther rndependence nor the
maintenance of the status quo as the end-
result of negotrations between thc Belgrade
authonties and the Kosovo Albanian lead-
ership on the status of Kosovo Wrthout
preludgrng rrhat that result may be, u'e
base the pnncrples for a solutron to the
Kosovo problem on the terntonal rntegntv
of the Federal Repubhc of Yugoslavra and
on OSCE standards, Helsrnkr prrncrples,
and the IIN Chartcr Such a solutron must
take into account the rrghts of the Kosovar
Albanrans and all those who hve ln
Kosovo Wc support a substantralll'
greater degrce of autonoml' for Kosovo
u'hich must rncludc meanrngful self-
admrnrstratron "
170 A comprehenslvc \\'eapons embargo on the
FRY, Resolution 1160, ri,as adopted b1' the Se-
cunty Councrl on 3l March 1998 urth all mcm-
bcrs in favour except Chrna, whrch abstarned
4. The political situation in Serbia
17 | Serbra rs hkelv to rcmarn the troublemaker
rn the regron as long as its polrtrcal leadershrp rs
unreformed and undemocratrc. chngrng to an un-
reconstructed socrahst economy uhrch rt controls
to rts oun advantagc Prcsident Mrlosevrc and
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his cronres strll enloy' pnvrleged acccss to hard
currcncy from the Scrbran central bank and
benefit from lucrattve spectal dcals.
172 Serbra's economy ls ln ver)'bad shape as a
result of rnternational sancttons and pervastve
government corruptlon Prevtous sanctions, re-
sultrng from earlier FRY measures regardrng
Kosovo and the war ln Bosnta and Herzegovtna,
have made the FRY inehgrble for international
loans and ard programmes from the World Bank
and the Internattonal Monetary Fund.
173 The European Unton suspended certatn
preferential tariffs tn January 1988 because of
concerns over a number of human rtghts issues,
rncludrng Kosovo
174 The economlc sancttons announced by the
Contact Group - a freezc on more than $100
mrlhon in state funds beheved to be held over-
seas, and a moratonum on govcrrlment-financed
export credrt support for trade tnvestment - u'rll
most probably have a moderate effect rf rmposed.
But the threat of such sancttons is holdrng back
forergn rnvestors and rutntng bustness prospects
rn thc FRY, r.vhere thc economl' has shrunk b1'
60% srnce 1989
175 At the moment. Presrdent Mtlosevrc's
marn concern seems to be self-preservation at
an1' cost. and tragrcallv cnough, recent clecttons
have shoun that there ts no credtble or accept-
able alternatrve Domcstlc opposttion rcmalns
u'cak and drvrded Thc opposrtron Za;edno alh-
ance, conslstrng of the Scrbran Renelval Move-
ment. the Democrattc Par[' and thc Crvrl Alh-
ance u'htch held massrve antt-govcrnment dem-
onstratlons rn latc 1996 and earll' 1997, has
completcll' dtsrntegrated. mainlv because of per-
sonal strtfe and the ambtttons of rts leaders. Thc
manoeuvrlng of Vuk Draskovtc. a one-ttme dls-
sident and Zapdno leader, to form a coalttton
government rvith Mr Milosevrc's once desprsed
Socrahst Partl'has again demonstrated the chaos
of Serbran polrtics. The 1997 presrdentral and
parhamentary' electtons demonstrated that Serb
voters constdered the radical natronalist and for-
mer u'arlord Volrslav Sesell as the only real al-
ternatrve to Slobodan Mrloscl'rc
176. In July'1997, Slobodan Mrlosevrc \\'as
elected unopposcd to be Presrdent of thc Federal
Repubhc of Yugoslavra (FRY) Thrs electton
\\'as staged because thc Scrbran constitution
barrcd hrm from runntng for a thrrd tcrm as Ser-
bran President u,hcn hrs second term ended tn
December 1997
l7'7 The presidcntial clectrons tn Serbra turned
out to be an extremelv complicated affarr A
first electron rn trvo rounds, rn September and
October 1997, pitting Milosevic's protege, Zoran
Lihc, agarnst Volrslav Sesell was deemed to have
becn rnvahd because thc tumout rn the second
round was less than 50%. The second election in
tu'o rounds rvas held tn December 1997 rvrth
Mrlosevrc's crony, Mrlan Mrlutinovic, against
Vojrslav Sesell in the second round. This elec-
tion whrch the OSCE clarmed to be
''fundamentalll' flawed", brought victory to
Mr Milutrnovic with 59 23% of the vote. agalnst
37 57% for Mr Sesel.l
178 The neu' Serb government. rvhtch \\'as es-
tablrshed on 24 March in Belgrade after six
months of deliberatrons follorving the parltamen-
tan' electtons of September 1997. won a vote of
confidence m parltament wrth 169 rn favour and
49 agarnst. The coalitron goverrlment ls com-
posed of representattves of Mr Mtlosevtc's
Socialist Partl'. Mira Markovrc (Mrs Mrlosevrc)
the Yugoslav Unrted Left (JUL. an alhance of
mdustrral leaders and idcologrsts) rvhrch togethcr
have I l0 seats, and of Vojislav Seselj's Serbran
Radrcal Party,' (SRS) rvhrch has 82 of the total
250 parhamentary seats.
179 The govcmment, led b1' prime mrntster
Marko Mar.lanovtc. a Milosevrc supporter. ln-
cludes 35 mmrstcrs of rvhich 15 belong to Mr
Sesel.;'s part)' Mr Sesel; and hrs deputy,
Tomrslav Nicohc, are two of the five uce-pnme
minrsters
180 The Serbian Renerval Movement (SPO) of
Vuk Draskovrc, who left the Zapdno opposltlon
coalrtion rn order to make a brd to become prtme
mrnrster, ts not partrcrpatrng tn the government
coalrtron.
18l Prime Minrster Mar.lanovtc declared that
hrs governmcnt was resolved to fight Albanran
"terrorism and separatlsm" ln Kosovo u'rth "all
Icgal means" He assured mmorittes that they
could ''en;o1' all rights, according to the hrghest
internatronal standards", but that "nog'here on
earth rvas there a basis for drvrdrng the territory
of a statc" He offered Kosovar Albanrans ''an
open dralogue rvtthout prehmtnary conditrons for
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the bcst possrble solutrons rn the field of human
rights", but he called Kosovo "an rnahenablc part
of Serbia"
182 Notivrthstanding the brazenness rvhrch he
has shorm in the pursuit of hrs polrtrcal oblec-
tivcs, Mr Mrlosevrc has achrevcd little He
started thc u,ar rn former Yugoslavra bccauss he
did not rvant Slovcnia and Croatla to become
independent. Later he had to resrgn himself to
the secession of Slovenra. Then he lost the g,ar
agalnst Croatra, even having to give up the orrgr-
nally domrnant Serb regions of Kralrna and East-
ern Slavonia Recently hc has had to srvallou,the
political dcfeat of his radrcal cronres rn Repub-
hka Srpska. He came to powcr defendrng a radr-
cal natronalist programme. If he uants to maln-
tarn hrs po\\'cr base, he carutot give up Kosovo,
rvhrch rs the last trump card he has to shorv hrs
Serb supporters that he rvrll alrvavs protect thcrr
historic rights and terrrtory,
183 Most Serbs agree rvrth Mr Mrloseuc's
arguments for not glvmg up Kosovo but the-"- are
not ven, enthusiastrc about loining forccs and
startrng a ne\\-\\'ar Thev have comc to the con-
clusron that they lost the u-ar in formcr Yugosla-
via notu'rthstandrng early success and vrctories
and that economic disaster and gnndrng po!,ert)'
rn Serbia is thc only tangible rcsult of all the
fightrng
184. Presrdent Mliosevrc's fanatrc pursuit of hrs
natronalist ob;ectrves rn Serbra. u,hrch even after
the rvar rn formcr Yugoslavra rs strll multi-ethnrc.
mav have consequenccs for the cohesron of hrs
countn'
185. Thcre rs a possrbrlrtv that the call for rndc-
pendence rn Kosovo and thc nature of Mr
Mrlosevrc's reactions r.l,ill have reverberatrons rn
Montenegro and parts of the Serb Repubhc such
as Volvodrna. Sandjak and Sumad4a, all of
*'hrch harbour gnevanccs against the govemment
rn Belgrade
186 The clearest stgns of opposrtron agatnst
Mr Milosevlc can be drscemed rn Montenegro,
the sccond of the trvo repubhcs s,hlch together
constrtute the FRY In August 1997, the run-up
to thc presrdential elections ln that repubhc
caused a struggle betrveen pro- and antr-
Miloscvrc factions, resulting rn a splrt in the rui-
rng Democrat party of Socialists of Montenegro
(DPSCG) Presidcnt Momrr Bulatovic and thc
Pnmc Mrnrstcr. Mrlo D.;ukanovrc. stood as can-
didates for thc rr'',al factrons
187 In Octobcr 1997, Mrlo D.;ukanovrc, uho
had vorccd opposrtron to thc Yugoslav Prcsidcnt
and fal'oured grcater rndcpcndence for Montcnc-
gro, \\'as elected Presrdcnt rn a second round of
electrons
188 President Mrloscvrc's rnflexrble attrtude in
the Kosovo crists has been openly crrticrsed bv
the President of Montencgro, Mrlo D.lukanovrc,
rvho called Mrlosevic an "autocrat" who
"demohshes the Yugoslavian instrtutions". He
also said that thc FRY is not berng threatened b1,
anv separatrsm, as clarmed b1, Mr Mrlosevrc. but
only' bi' thc contrnuation of his polrtrcal and eco-
nomrc cnmrnalrtr'li' ,
189. Srnce comrng to po!\'cr. President D1u-
kanovrc has becn stnvrng to obtain economlc
independcnce for Montenegro and he has alread1,,
started to rntroduce economlc reform.
190 In April 1998, Prcsrdent Dlukanovrc vrs-
rted ser,'cral Western caprtals in order to seck
support for his pohcv On hrs visrt to Pans, he
dcclarcd that the pohcv of the FRY '-rnevrtablv
leads to drsaster" and to the "collectrve suicrde"
of the country,2r
l9l Out of a total populatron of 650 000 in-
habrtants. there arc 45 000 Albanrans rn Monte-
negro Mr D-lukanovrc favours thc ''greatest
posslble autonom),'' for the Kosovar Albanians
and accepts thc pnncrplc of rnternatronal medra-
tlon
192 The posrtrons taken bv Presrdent D1u-
kanovrc arc rclcr.ant for the polrcv of the FRY
becausc. dcsprte rts smaller srze. Montenegro has
the same u'erght rn votes on mattcrs regardrng thc
pohci, and constrtution of the Federatron Wsst-
ern caprtals have therefore sct therr sights on the
Presrdent of Montenegro to alter Yugoslav pohcv
rn Kosovo
5. The risk of the conflict in Kosot,o
spreading to neighbouring states
193 Thcre is a rvrdesprcad popular bchef. es-
pecrallv favoured by'thc media, that a conflrct rn
Kosovo urli lead to a nerv and even more cxtcn-
sivc uar in the Balkans Commentators are in-
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dulgrng in nrghtmarc scenarlos about *hat u'rll
happcn rf thc prcscnt cnsls escalatcs Into an
armcd confltct bctu'ecn Serbs and Kosovar AI-
banrans In therr vro\\'. such a confltct riqll first
sprcad to Albanra and FYROM and thcn lead to
the rnvolvement of Bulgana, Grecce and Turkcl'
In vour Rapporteur's vlc\\', thcre ts hltle lustrfi-
catron for thrs extendcd u'ar theon'. Lakrng rnto
account thc rnterests and rcacttons of the drffer-
ent countncs mcnttoned
(a) Albania
194. In Albanra. as elservhcre, the outburst of
violence rn Kosovo at the cnd of February and
beginning of March 1998 drd not come as a sur-
pnse. Immedratelr' after the first krlhngs, the
govenxnent of Albanra called on Belgrade ''to
stop the escalatton of vtolence and terror agatnst
Albanians m Kosovo", u'arning that "thc deteno-
ratron of the sttuatton there carnes brg nsks for
pcace m the Balkans and be1'ond" Thc Prtme
Mrnrster. Fatos Nano, also asked for Wcstern
help rn strengthentng hrs beleaguered I 5 000-
strong armv
195 Albanra rs strll tryrng to rccover from the
crvil stnfe u'hrch brought about near total chaos
rn earl1, 1997 The neu' government. xhrch has
been rn po\\er srnce July' 1997. knou's that rt
rvould lose the goodurll and support of the tntcr-
national communttv for economrc and ctvtl re-
constructlon rt has cauttouslv estabirshed rf rt
allorvs the countn'to be draggcd tnto r'tolencc tn
nerghbounng Kosovo
196 Pnme N'lrnrster Fatos Nano's govcrnmcnt
has estabhshed a progralnme of far-reaching
cconomrc rcform and he is tryrng to tnvoh'e thc
opposrtron Dcmocratrc Partl' of ex-President Sah
Berrsha in that cffort At the samc ttme. hou'-
evcr, Mr Nano has been carn'tng out a masslve
purge among crvrl scrvants and the 
.yudrctarv
manv of u'hom obtarncd therr postttons u'rth thc
help of the former gor,'crnment, u,htch resultcd in
drsaffectron rvhen the ncw government camc to
po\\'er
197. Dcsprte the sustarned cfforts of both Euro-
peans and Amerrcans to hclp the go'r'ernment re-
burld thc natron and re-estabhsh a state of lau,
and order. thc countn'rs strll plagued b1' unrcst
and instabrhty'
198 The sccurttv sltuatron rn the north of Al-
banra, rvherc the former Presrdcnt, Sah Berrsha,
has hrs power basc. rs strll volatrle [n Fcbruan'
1998. the Albanran arm\' \\'as caught ln t\\'o
Iengthl, skrrmrshes ri rth bandrts attemptrng to
loot barracks rn thc torrn of Kukes ncar the bor-
der rrrth Kosovo and KLA tnvolvement \\'as sus-
pected
199 On 22 February 1998, a group of armcd
and masked bandrts took possession of thc crtl' of
Shkodir rn northern Albanra. set the pubhc
buildrngs on fire and lootcd banks and shops
The next da1'. raprd tntcrvention forces expclled
the bandrts from the citv, arresttng some of them
The government and opposttton accused each
other of tryrng to provoke anarchl' In the after-
math of these events. eleven parttsans of Mr
Berisha, rncludrng a formcr minister, Ah Kazazi,
uere arrested
200 Ignonng a pohcc tnterdictton, Mr Ber-
rsha's Democratrc Partv organtsed a demonstra-
tron ln Tirana on 25 Fcbruarl'. durrng rihrch the
formcr President callcd for masstve protests m
the u'hole countn to dcmand neu'electtons
2Ol ln a recent rntcnres'22, Mr Nano stated
that thcre are even feu'er outbursts of violencc in
the north, u'hrle adminrng that the roads rn the
south are not als'avs ven' safe But he takes the
viex'that overall. the gol'ernment has the country
under control
202 Accordrng to N{r Nano, ethnrc cleanstng tn
Kosovo u'ould rcsult tn a mass mlgratron of Al-
banran refugccs rnto Albanra and FYRON( and
lcad to xrdesprcad sohdarttv on the part of the
Albanian populatron u'hrch riould set the regton
on fire But rn r rcs of the unequal balance of
mrlrtan po\\'er bctueen Serbs and Albanrans. he
consrders a Northern Ircland scenano u'tth har-
assmcnt and altacks as more ltkelv Thrs u'ould
also lcad to thc rnvolvcment of Albanran cltlzens
bccause of the manv sxtsttng famrly' tres thel'
havc urth Kosovar Albanrans Mr Nano re.;ected
rumours of the exlstcncc of KLA tralnlng camps
rn thc northem Albanran mountalns as
"propaganda from Belgradc and Moscou "
203 Albanra u'tshcs to bccome a responstblc
actor on the rcgronal drplomatrc stage Mr Nano
argues that hrs countn ls a "passlonate supportcr
of temperance and peaceful cohabrtation betwcen
the peoples of the Balkans" Relatrons u'rth
" ruYn,ra, 7 Apnl I998
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Greece and FYROM havc tmproved and reccntlv
contacts havc bccn cstabhshcd w'rth Montcncgro
for the first trmc Thrs bchavrour, savs Mr Nano.
should sufficrcntll' demonstrate that Trrana docs
not harbour the drcam of a Greater Albanra Mr
Nano rs not rn favour of rndcpendcnce for
Kosovo He lvould prefer it to be an autonomous
repubhc rvrthrn the FRY, u'rthout the right of
secesslon.
204 The NATO Council met *'ith Albanian
representatrves on I I March m the frameu'ork of
the Partnership for Peace programme u'hrch al-
lolvs those countries who feel their secunt)' mter-
ests directll'threatened to convoke an emcrgencv
meetmg urth NATO's l6 members and drscuss
u'hat remedres can bc found u'rthout, hou'ever,
obligrng the NATO alhes to rcspond
205 Albanra's Deputy Defence Mrnistcr,
Penklr Teta, sard that hrs country u'ould rvelcomc
a monrtoring force srmilar to LINPREDEP rn
FRYOM rrhrch. he sard. shon,ed hou'preventrvc
deplorment could hclp dcfuse tensrons rn a vola-
trle regron NATO approved a plan to help the
Albanran Govcrnmcnt stcm the flou' of arms.
drugs and guernlla fighters rnto Kosovo. It also
started to arrange for the provision of food. tcnts
and blankets to help Albanra cope srth a possrblc
sudden influx of refugees, rf vrolence rn Kosovo
escalated It stopped short of decrdrng to drs-
patch a NATO-led peacekeeping force to contarn
the conflrct and mamtarn peace along the bordcr
betx'een Kosovo and Albanra NATO experts
had concluded that there u'as no rmmrnent threat
to Albanra's soverelgntv rvhrch called for an ur-
gent deplolment of NATO troops In therr
oprnlon. sendrng a NATO rapid reactron forcc rn
thc absence of anv Serbran concentratron of
troops and equrpment ncar thc border x'ould bc a
prcmature and possrbly' provocatrve gcsturc
rvhrch could escalate vrolence betrveen Serbs and
Albanians2s That same dar, WEU also rulcd
out the option of armed rntenentron bv a multi-
national force rn Kosovo or Albanra
206 On 25 March, NATO's membcr states
approved the rndividual partnershrp programme
betrveen NATO and Albania u'hrch contarns
practrcal measurcs to readapt the Albanian
armed forces aftcr the turmorl of 1997 in general
and cnablc thcm to dcal u'rth consequcnccs of thc
cnsrs ln Kosovo rn partrcular
207 NATO rs opcnurg a temporan, officc rn
Trrana rn order to coordrnate Alhancc assrstancc
to Albanra rn the contcrt of thc rndrvrdual part-
nershrp programme Thrs officc rs also coordi-
nating thc follou'-up to the mrsslon of erght cx-
pert teams uhrch havc bcen deplovcd rn Albanra
since earll' Aprrl 1998 to make an mventorl, of
requirements tn dtfferent fields. Border securitl'
and the control and safetl' of ammurution and
arms depots are consrdered the highest priorrties
Other tasks for thc cxpert teams are the com-
mand and control of armed forccs, crvil cmcr-
gencv measures and assrstance for thc tramtng
and deplol,ment of forccs
(b) Bulgaria
20tt Bulgarra has also chosen the road tou'ards
polrtrcal and ccononuc stabrlrtv In Januan'
199'l 
. a u'holcsalc collapsc of the natronal econ-
om1, causcd stnkcs. masslve darlv antr-govcrn-
mcnt demonstratrons and a stand-off betu'een thc
ruhng Bulganan Socrahst partl' (BSP) and the
opposrtron Unron of Democratrc Forces (UDF).
209. Presrdent Petar Stovanov (UDF), rr'ho took
office on 22 Januan' i997. appornted an rntcrior
cabmet and a general election u'as held on 19
Apnl This electron rcsulted in a clear \'lctory
for the UDF x'hrch obtarned 137 of the total of
240 seats rn parhamcnt The Democrattc Lcft.
rncludrng the BSP. obtarncd 58 scats
210 ln Ma)'. thc ne\\ Natronal Assembll
adopted a declaratron on natronal conscnsus as
proposcd bv the LIDF Latcr. parhament gar,'c its
votc of confidcncc to a nc\\' governmcnt undcr
Pnmc Mrnrster Ir,'an Kostor'. u'rth only thc mcm-
bcrs of the Democratrc Lcft r otrng agalnst Thc
govcrnmcnt cmphasrsed the need to pnvatrse and
rcstructurc the cconomr'. to frcc pnccs and to
reform the legal svstcm rn order to attract rn-
creased forcrgn lnvcstn.lcnt It declarcd \\ar on
organrscd cnme and corruptlon Frnallv. tt sard
rt *'ould make even possrblc cffort to becomc a
full1'-fledged member of the EU and NATO
2ll These posltlve developments resulted in a
US$ 6-57-mrlhon financral package from the IMF
to assrst Bulgana's economlc recovcr)'. some
US$ 300 mrlhon ln ne\\' loans from the European
Bank for Rcconstructron and Dcvelopmentt\rtrroononal Ileralcl Trtbune,12 March 1998
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(EBRD) and a US$ 40-mrlhon World Bank loan
for thc purchase ofgoods rn short supply
212 Srncc thcn. thc govcmmcnt has u'orkcd
cncrgetrcallv It has amcnded the larv on pnvatl-
satron to make rt lcss rcstrrctrve and a neu' for-
ergn rnvestment brll removed some important rc-
strrctions on forergn rnvestors
213 In vreu' of thrs poh*,, thc Bulgarian Gov-
ernment has an apparent mterest in the preven-
tron of conflrcts rn the regton and rts olrn in-
volvement m such conflrcts. From recent experi-
ence, Bulgaria knou's that rt rs in the front hne,
suffering the consequences of an intemalonal
embargo against Serbia It is u'orkrng to improve
relatrons ii'rth nerghbounng countnes. As an
example. thc vrsrt to Bulgaria of thc Turkrsh
Pnmc Mrnrster, Mcsut Yrlmaz, ln Deccmber
1997 should be mcntroncd, u'hcn agrccmcnts
u'cre srgned for rncrcased cooperatron rn thc
areas of law cnforccmont. customs and cultural
affarrs
(c) The Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM)
214 In the Former Yugoslav Rcpubhc of Mac-
edonra (FYROM). bctu'een 22%o and 34o/, of thc
2 2 mrlhon rnhabrtants rdentrfi' themselves as
Albanran
215 In the earli' 1990s. thc Government of
FYRON{ made a great effort not to bccome rn-
loll'ed rn the vrolence u'hrch has ravaged othcr
parts of formcr Yugoslavra At present. rt has no
rntercst rn berng draun rnto a ncx' conflrct rrhrch
could thrcaten tts o\\n existcncc as an independ-
ent state Thc government has unambrguouslr
askcd for forcrgn hclp. rncludlng an extcndcd
mandate for UNPREDEP. thc Unrtcd Natrons
monrtonng mtsslon. to prcvcnt a sprll-ovcr of anv
possrble conflrct rn Kosovo
216 In the Dcfence Commrttee rcport on the
Balkans u'hrch rvas drscussed at the Dcccmbcr
1997 plenan' sesslon of thc Assemblr'za. rt \\'as
sard that the mrssron of the Unrtcd Natrons Pre-
ventive Deplorment Force (IINPREDEP) u,as
becomrng more rmportant for the preventron and
management of mounting rnternal strrfe and of
Albanran secesslontst actrvrtrcs The rvisdom of
' 
I|*"p"'t role tn the prcvenlron ancl ntanagentent of
cnses ul the Bolkans. Rapporteur Mr Blaau'rr,. Assem-
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thc Sccurrtv Councrl's dccrsron to rcducc the UN
mrssron;s mrlrtary component was callcd rnto
qucstlon
217 Nevertheless. the Sccurity Council decrded
rn December 1997 that LINPREDEP's renerved
mandate should not be extended beyond the end
of August 1998 The Security Council ;ustified
rts decrsron on the grounds that there had been a
number of positrve developments in the overall
srtuation rn the area, citing in particular reduced
tensions in Albania The 300-man troop reduc-
tron out of a total of I 050 LINPREDEP troops,
decrded at the beginnrng of 1997 but delayed by
the chaotrc srtuation in Albania, was finally im-
plemented rn November 1997 as the start of a so-
called "phased exrt" strategv In Novembcr last
vcar. the IJN Secretan'-General, Kofi Annan.
told the Securrtv Councrl that any strategy,should
cnsurc that ''proper successor arrangements" arc
rn placc to reassurc the government of FYROM
of the lntcrnatlonal communitv's "contrnued
conmltment to peace and stabrlity"
218 There are many,good rcasons for a contm-
ucd presence of forcrgn troops rn FYROM. De-
sprte huge efforts and posrtive achievements rn
the rmplementatlon of the DaWon Peace Agree-
mcnt. the srtuatron rn Bosnia and Herzegovina
has not 1'et stabrhsed enough to permtt the rvith-
draw'al of forergn troops from that country. In
neighbourrng Albanra, the government is still far
from har''rng the ri'hole country, under firm con-
trol It rs also noted that more than a vear after
thc start of negotratrons bctrveen the Federal Re-
pubhc of Yugoslar,'ra and FYROM, no agreement
has been reached on the demarcatron of several
sensltlvc strctches of FYROM's northem border
urth Serbra. rvhrch arc monitored bv
LINPREDEP troops
219 N{oreover. the govcrnment's attitude to-
u'ards mrnontY nghts rvhrch led to senous
clashes u'rth ethnrc Albanrans dunng the summer
of I997. may' be fertrlc ground for more radical
factrons rn both marn ethnrc communitrcs, and
cou[d exacerbate domestlc tenslons in the run-up
to a general electron in autumn 1998.
220 At the present trme. horvever, the main
reason for a further extension of IINPREDEP's
mission are the recent vrolent clashes betu'een
Scrb troops and ethnic Albanrans in Kosovo, be-
causc lt rs generallv assumed that a further deter-
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loration of the sltuatlon rn Kosovo could casilv
have reverberatrons in FYROM
221. As regards the present srtuatron of
LINPREDEP, rt rs noted that a 350-mcmber US
peacckeepmg battalion rs patrolhng FYROM's
drsputed border u'rth Serbia, whrlc the 5O0-strong
Nordrc battalion monitors the border rvrth Alba-
nra and Kosovo.
222. On 9 March, the Contact Group recom-
mended that consideration be grven to adaptrng
the current I-,NPREDEP mandate. supportrng the
maintenance of an rntemational military prcsence
on the ground in FYROM rvhen the current man-
date of UNPREDEP expires rn August 1998.
223 The IIN Secunty' Councrl rs no\\'expected
to extend the mandate of LNPREDEP bevond
August 1998
224 FYROM rs also u'orried that an armed
conflrct in Kosovo might cause Kosovar AIba-
nrans to flee to lts terntor), President Gligorov
has suggestcd creatrng a ''corridor'' rn the u'est-
ern part of FYROM through rvhich Albanian
refugees from Kosovo could be drrected to Al-
bania rtself urthout upsettmg the fragrle inter-
ethruc relatrons in FYROM
225 Apart from the immediate need for a sur-
l'erllance of rts borders, FYROM has also a more
general problem u,ith the defence of rts tcrntory
226 Wrth a 15 00O-strong conscnpt armr, and
a defence budget of $70 mrlhon. FYROM has no
real capacrtv to defcnd itself It rs therefore sug-
gested that there must bc a long-term forergn
commitment to the modernlsatlon and training of
FYROM's armed forces rvhich. rt is said, could
be done under the ausplces of NATO or as part
of an enhanced Partnership for Peace pro-
gramrne It has also been suggested that NATO
trammg exercises be organrsed on FYROM's
ternton' rn order to mvolvc thc country more
closely rn Western securltv structures.
227 FYROM's Defence Mrnrster. Lazar Kfia-
noskt, has asked for the stationrng of NATO
troops rn his countrv The Mrnrster agrees rvrth
an extended mandate of UNPREDEP but em-
phasises that the UN troops can onl1, lvatch and
report whrle NATO troops could provide effec-
tivc protcction ofthe natronal terntorl'and avord
a brgger cnsrs ln the Balkans
228 At a rccent meetrng urth Mr Krtanoskr. the
US Dcfence Secrctan', Wrllram Cohen. porntcd
out that the US supports thc prolongatron of an
rnternatronal mrlitarl' prcsence rn FYROM after
3l August 1998
229 NATO rs consrdcnng holdrng a maJor
Partnership for Peace (PfP) excrclse called
"Cooperatrve Best Chance'' rn FYROM rn Sep-
tember 1998 and lt mav decrde to estabhsh a
permanent PfP trainrng ccntre rn that countn.
230 The Albanrans rn FYROM have closc
links with the Kosovar Albanians. The Partl' for
Democratrc Prosperitl,, supported by nearlv three
quartcrs of FYROM's Albanrans. provrdes eco-
nomrc and humanitarran ard to Kosovar Alba-
nlans. Thcre rs no e'"'rdence that rt supphes the
arm)' The Partv's lcader. Arbcn Shaferr. de-
clares that he knou's nothrng about hnks betueen
the KLA and Albanrans rn FYRONI
231 In earlr, 1998, pohce stations m the touns
of Pnlep and Kumanovo \\erc bombed, but no-
one clarmed responsrbrlrtl'
232 The Albanrans rn FYROM have politrcal
parties, partrcrpatc rn elcctrons. occup)'one stxth
of all scats rn Parhament and hold five govern-
ment ministnes Strll. thcl are undcr-reprcsentcd
rn darlv government. representrng no morc than
3o/o of all pohce forccs and no more than 
-5% of
all government posltrons In order to achteve
therr ambrtrons. thcse Albanrans u'ant morc
polrtrcal po\\'er and the Partv of Democratrc
Prosperrtv rs scckrng autonomv for thc Albanran
part ofthc countn' Thev have cstabhshed a pri-
vate Albanran unrverslty' rn Tetovo u'hrch rs not
rccognised b1, thc govcrnmcnt
233 As regards the educatronal sr stcm. Alba-
nrans and other Maccdonrans have drvergent
oplnrons The Albanrans consrdcr that a full
educatron rn Albanian from prrmary school to
universrtv rs a step fonvard tox'ards full democ-
rac)' The Nlacedonlan ma3ont)' argues that such
a s.vstem uould entarl the nsk of -'ghettotsatton"
of Albanrans FYROM's Pnmc Mtntster.
Branko Crvenkovskr, underhnes that ln hrs
countrl,thcre rs a public dcbate on such lssues.
u'rthout clarmrng that all rntcr-ethnrc problcms
havc becn solvcd2s.
3l
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234 Thc marn opposrtron part1,. the Intcrnal
Maccdonran Revolutionary Organrsatron
(VMRO), backcd bv a quarter of Macedonrans.
has a close relatronshrp ivith Bulgarra. It could
cooperatc rvrth Mr Xhafcn's Partl' for Demo-
cratrc Prosperrty' u'rth the objcctrve of u,eakerung
thc central government and promotrng ethnrc
separatlon u'rthin the countn'
235 FYROM's econom), rs not rn very good
shape Economic grouth is berng impeded by,
rampant corruptron and contrnurng Communrst
habrts and the farth of ordinarl' crtrzens in their
state ls berng undermrned b1, thrs lack of eco-
nomic grouth
236 Still, there are enough forergn countnes
u'rth an intcrest in the survrval of FYROM as an
rndependent state to help rt resrst a spill-over
from a conflrct rn nerghbouring Kosovo
237 To namc only, a fcrv, rt should be men-
tioned that Grcece has no rnterest rn FYROM
berng splrt betu'cen Bulgaria and Albania Ser-
bra needs FYROM for access to the harbour of
Salonika through the Vardar vallev and the
Unrted States consrders FYROM to be a buffer
agalnst a regronal \\.ar ln u,hrch Greece and Tur-
key mrght become rnvolved
(d) Greece
238 Greece. as a member of the European
Unron. ls concentratlng lts efforts on Jolntng
European Monetan' Union. rvhrch rs rvrthout
doubt the present government's top pnont)' It
has therefore manv reasons to tn'to prevent any
conflrct in Kosovo or an extenslon lnto ncrgh-
bounng countncs It rs to be noted that therc arc
an cstrmated 300 000 Albanrans ln Grcece.
mostlv of them rllegal rmmigrants The majontl'
are camlng mone)' b1' dorng odd lobs rn crtles or
as seasonal u'orkers m the agncultural sector
Most of them cxpect to return to Albania26 In
March 1997. the Grcek Forergn Mrnrster. Theo-
doros Pangalos, pard thc first vrsrt bv a Greek
cabtnet mrnrster to FYROM slnca rts rndcpend-
ence rn 1991, x'hrch ivas an rmportant step to-
u'ards a badlr -needed rmprovement ln rclatrons
betrveen thc trvo nerghbourrng states Imme-
dratcll after the outbreak of violence rn Kosovo,
on 6 March. Mr Pangalos \\'ent to Belgrade,
calhng for a polrtrcal solutron to thc conflict
239 In a meetrng urth the Presrdcntral Commit-
tee of the WEU Asscmbly rn Athcns on 8 Apnl,
Mr Pangalos emphasrsed Grecce's posrtron of
relatrvc strcngth rn the Balkans, polntlng out that
rts GNP was equrvalcnt to the GNP of all other
Balkan states put togcther It therefore had a
mlsslon to excrt a stabrhsrng rnfluence Greece
\\'as prepared to be a medrator in the present cn-
srs. Its long hrstorical relatronshrp rvrth Belgrade
could be useful in these circumstances It had
absorbed its farr share of refugecs- but there u'as
a hmrt to rts capacrtl'
240 In anv event, Mr Pangalos argued that rt
rvas clear that the problcm in Kosovo could not
bc solved wrth u'eapons and requrrcd the help of
the intcrnational community because rt rvas not
an mternal problem. It had become an lnterna-
tronal problem bscausc it could develop rnto a
thrcat to collectrve secunty
241. On 8 Julr' 1997 . on the penphcn' of the
Madrid NATO summrt. Greece and Turkey
signed a "convergence of vieu's" document in
u'hich thel' agrccd to respcct each other's sover-
ergn rrghts and to renounce the use of force u,hen
deahng u'ith each other The loint statement
srgned b1' thc Turkrsh Presrdent. Sulelman
Demrrel. and the Greek Prime Mrntster, Costas
Simitrs, stated that both states \\'ere corrrmlmed to
"peace. sccuntv and the continuous development
of good-neighbourlv relatrons". The document
rncluded srgnrficant goodu'ill gesturcs from both
srdes, also regardrng thc drsputes over rrghts m
thc Aegean sea
242 It should also be notcd that on 7 Aprrl
1998. on the occasron of a meetrng of WEU
Chrefs-of-Staff at Vouhagmeni. the Chrefs-of-
Staff of Grcece and Turkey held a pnvate meet-
rng Thel' agreed to hold regular meetrngs to ex-
changc vreu.s and examlne brlateral problems It
u'as sard that thel' drscussed rval's of avordrng
tenslon rn the Aegean Thcse would rnclude the
avoidance of mrlrtary exerclses dunng the sum-
mer season
(e) A regional initiative
243 Frnallr,. rt should be mentioned that on l8
March. after tu'o days of discussrons, Albania,
Bulgana. FYROM. Romania and Turkev an-
nounced that they had reached a basrc agreement
to create a multrnational rapid rntcrvention force
to copc rvrth crrsrs srtuatrons. Greece had de-26 Kathtmertnr, 8 Apnl 1998
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chned Turkey's invrtatron to partrcrpatc rn thrs
force.
244. The agreement allorvs for particrpatron rn
thrs force at a later stage by any country in the
region wrlling and able to do so Thc rapid inter-
ventron force should not only be considered rn a
Balkans context, and could be used in crisrs-pre-
ventron and peacekeeprng operatlons under
NATO or WEU command and under a Unrted
Natrons or OSCE mandate
245. A future meeting in Bucharest is to decide
on the name of the force and the locatron of its
headquarters. Othcr sub3ects for discussion wrll
be logrstic, admrnrstrative and financral questions
as well as mechanisms for politrcal and mrlitary
consultations.
246. In conclusion, rt should be emphasised that
the main responsibility for prcventrng a spiral of
vrolence rests u,ith thc peoples and governmcnts
of the region But other European governments
and therr alhcs also have a responsrbility. They
have the means to help and should therefore hs-
ten carefully' to r,r,hat the countrres of the Balkan
region considcr to be rcqurred to prevent the vro-
lence spreadrng, The1, should not hesrtate to
supph', x'rthrn reason, the financial, technrcal and
milrtary tools needed for marntaining peace rn the
region
6. Towards a dialogue on the
future of Kosovo
247 After thc London Declaratron of the Con-
tact Group. Presrdent Mrlosevrc authorrsed the
Serbran Government to start negotrations u'ith
the leaders on rvhat he called the Albanian
natronal mrnoritv, ruhng out thrrd-party media-
tron
248 On 12 March, a Serbian delegatron, led b1,
Vice-Prime Mrnrster Radko Markovic, came to
Pristrna to "open a dialogue rvrthout prelimrnary
condrtions, but u'rthrn the framework of the Scr-
bian constitution" The delegation rvas snubbed
by' Kosovar Albanran leaders. rvho sard that the1,
had not even seen an official invrtation to hold
talks The day, before. the Kosovar Albanran
Ieader, Ibrahim Rugova. had declared that "the
only'acceptable solution for us is an rndependent
Kosovo, not some krnd of autonomy" The Ser-
bran Information Mrnrster, Radmrla Mtlentr.;cvrc,
retorted rn pubhc that this positron \\'as
"completely against our constrtutron" and
'-unacceptablc", addrng that it drd not offer "the
possibrlrty of ncgotratlons"
249 Another Kosovar Albanran leader. Adam
Demacr, has crrticrsed the concept of a dralogue
as interpreted b1,thc Serbs, say'ing that thcre had
been no "preparatron" for the dralogue and that
no agreement had been reachcd on a
"frameu,ork" for dralogue He also noted that
Serbs had come for a dialogue "as lords to therr
servants" Whrle Mr Rugova, u,ho condemns
terrorist acts, is calhng for Kosovo's rndepend-
ence, Mr Demaci, u'ho has shown understandrng
for the KLA's operatlons, is advocating a con-
federation of Serbra. Montenegro and Kosovo as
three equal cntrtics He thrnks that thrs u'ould be
accepLable to a ma.;onty of Serbs, partrcularlv
because rt u,ould strll cnable them to vrsrt therr
shrmes and monastencs ln Kosovo riithout any
problem
250 The Albanran leaders relected the Scrbran
offer on account of a number of arguments They
do not consider themselves as a natronal mrnorrtl,
in Serbra, but as a maJonty in Kosovo Secondlr,.
thcy do not accept the Scrbran conditton that nc-
gotratrons take place on the basis of the 1990
constitution rr'hrch abohshed Kosovo's autono-
mous status and uhrch ls not recognrsed by thc
Kosovar Albanrans Moreover. tt is the com-
monlv held vieri that negotlatrons do not make
sense rf Milosevrc rs not drrectlv rnvolved.
Finalll', the Kosovar Albanran leadershrp de-
clared that rt $as not rnterestcd tn a dralogue
u'ith the Serbran Govcrnment utthout thc prcs-
ence of a representatrve of the mternatronal
communrtv To thrs end, both thc OSCE and the
EU delegated Fehpe Gonzalez. but Presrdent
Mrlosevrc has untrl nou, refused to accept hrm as
a particrpant in thc negotratrons, because he con-
srders Kosovo to bc an lnternal affair
251. On 23 March, the Scrblan Government
and represcntatrves of the Kosovar Albanrans
concluded an agreement estabhshrng the rclnte-
gratton of Albanrans into all levels of cducatron
in Kosovo
252. Under the agreement, Albanian studcnts
urll return to state cducatronal establishments rn
phases bl' 30 June Srnce the tu'o srdes farled to
agrse on a loint tcachrng programme, Albanrans
and Serbs u'rll bc taught rn separate shifts rn therr
own languages u'ith different curncula.
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253 The agrccmcnt notes that there arc strll
unresolvcd problcms regardrng mattcrs of
financc, managemcnt. common languagc. cur-
ncula, drplomas and the status of unrversrty' em-
ployccs The Sant'Egrdro Communrtv ri'rll rcmarn
rn Serbra to oversee thc rmplementatron of rts
mediatron efforts
254 It should be noted that a srmrlar agreement
had already' been signed b1' President Mrloscvrc
and Mr Rugova rn Septcmber 1996, but it was
nel'er implemented bccause of drsagreement over
language and curriculum Serb student leaders
and the rector of Prrstrna Universrtv rmmedrately
denounced the agrecment as ''betrayal" of the
Scrbian people rn Kosovo
255 On 24 March. Mr Rugova nomrnated a
group of l5 "prcsrdentral counsellors", charged
rvrth prepanng a platform of negotratrons u'rth
thc represcntatrves of Presrdcnt N(rlosevrc Mr
Rugol'a emphasrsed that at thrs stagc rt rvas a
matter of startrng consultatrons, not ncgotlatlons
He rnsisted on the nomlnatlon of a medrator to
facrlrtate the discussron and to guarantee rcsults
In an intervrerr'. Mr Rugova declared that he had
been elected Presrdent to secure rndependence
He thought that a transitronal penod uould be
needed. as u'ould the demrlrtansatron of Kosovo
and rntematronal protcctron But hc made rt clear
that grantrng Kosovo rndcpendence u'ould be the
onlv rvav to stabrhse the regron and prcvent thc
srtuatlon becomrng explosrl'eI
256 Whrlc relcctrng evcn' fresh Serbran effort
to open a dralogue u hrch drd not meet fundamen-
tal Albanran condrtrons. Kosovar Albanrans.
shorvrng that thel rntcnded to pursue therr ob.1ec-
trve, dreu up a delegatron for negotlatrons on
6 Apnl Thrs delcgatron consrsts of Fehmr
Agamr, Counscllor to Ibrahrm Rugova. Mahmut
Bakah. former party leader of Kosor,'o. Veton
Surro;, edrtor-rn-chref of the Kosovar Albanran
newspaper Koha Drtore, and Enver Maloqu,
Charrman of the Kosovar human rrghts com-
mittee
251 On 7 Apnl, the Serbran Parhament
adopted a proposal to hold a referendum on
23 April on the questron of u'hcther Serbs accept
forergn involvement rn thc search for a solutron
of the Kosovo problenr
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258 After several frurtlcss efforts by' a Scrbran
delcgatron under Vrcc-Prrme Mrnrster Markovrc
to engage rn a draloguc urth the Kosovar Alba-
nrans, rt u'as thc Bosntan Serb Presrdent. Mrlan
Mrlutrnovic. u,ho on 7 Aprrl headed a Serbran
dclegatron rn Pnstrna. but the Kosovar Albanrans
refused to negotrate for the tenth trmc, rnsrstrng
again that thel' would only' talk to a delegatron
from the FRY, rn thc presence of an intcmatronal
medrator, and u'ould not do so untrl the Serbran
special pohce uruts w'rthdreu'from Kosovo
259. Since then. no substantral progrcss to-
wards thc opcning of a dralogue has been re-
ported, and it is likelv that cach of the two camps
rvill stick bt, rts posrtron until the results of the
Serbian referendum of 23 Apnl become knorm,
Just one da1' before thc ncxt mcetrng of the Con-
tact Group u'hrch rs to reassess the srtuatlon tn
vrew of the possrble rmposrtron of further sanc-
tions
260 Is there anv possrble perspectlve for a
dralogue under such drrc crrcumstances? Indeed.
as has been pornted out bv one comrnentatorzE. a
dralogue u'ould onlr,' be possrble rf the current
conditrons of ghettorsatron, polrtrcal disenfran-
chtsement and deprrvatron of basrc crvrl hbertrcs
ceased to extst
261 At a later stagc. thc status of Kosovo
could develop rnto one of a constltuent republic
of the Fcderal Repubhc of Yugoslavla, as sug-
gested by Mr Adam Dcmacr It has nghtll' bccn
suggested bv Helsrnkr Human Rrghts Commrttees
rn Kosovo. Serbra and Montenegro that a Day-
ton-hke proccss bc rnrtratcd Thrs u'ould requlre
large human and matenal resources. careful
preparatlon. the negotratron of terms and a search
for any'potentral thrnkrng space on both srdes rn
order to leave room for manocuvre
262. The mrnrmum solutron to the problems rn
Kosovo at thrs stage u'ould seem to be to restorc
rts autonom\', glvrng local poler to the Alba-
nrans, On the other hand. the human. crvll and
cultural rrghts of thc Scrbs in Kosovo should be
rccognrsed In other w'ords. the maloritl' should
have a po\\.er uhrch rs hmrtcd m order to protect
the minorrh'
- e-o" nfroAes in the Internattonol Heralcl Trtbune,
18 March 1998
3.1
DOCLMENT I608
263 In vrew of thc poisoned relatronshrp be-
trvccn the two nationalrties, it seems that pcace
urll onl1, bc possrble through forcign involve-
ment, which rs an obligatron and a rrght under the
crrcumstances, thc more so, becausc rn the hght
of recent experlence, opinrons about the rrght of
states to protect therr 
- 
often collectrve 
- 
secunty
have developed and changed.
264 Since the end of the cold war. the notron of
collectrve secunty rs no longer restrrcted to that
of defence against a possible aggressor. Vrolent
submrssion of parts of the population of a coun-
tr)' accompanred by war cnmes and crimes
agamst humanity are nou'adays also consrdered
to threaten collcctrve secunty. In thc e1'es of
manv thrs can no longer bc regarded as an lnter-
nal affarr, out ofbounds for all other natrons
Conclusions
265 Implementation of the Dalton Peace
Agreemcnt rs slol, cumbersome and parnful
Progress has been made on a number of rssues,
but therc are strll ma.1or shortcommgs. The role
of the Hrgh Representative, s'ho ls no\\' usrng hrs
authontv to make brndrng decisrons, rs crucial
266 The results of murucrpal electrons are be-
rng put mto effect but rn a dozcn munrcrpalrties
there are strll malor problems. Common rnstrtu-
trons are takrng shape, but only'at a very slorv
pace. and here also. the authontl, of the Hrgh
Representatrve rs rndrspensable
267 A ma.;or issue of conccrn rcmalns the rc-
turn of refugees and displaced persons, a vrtal
part of the Dal'ton Peace Agreemcnt All threc
partles mvolved are obstructrng that return
through legal and illcgal means Recent riots and
mob vrolence m Drvar and Den,enta have agarn
demonstrated that peace rn the country rs fragrle
268 Altogether, it rs only' logrcal that. rn accor-
dancc *'ith the opinron of the Contact Group. the
decrsron should have been takcn to extcnd the
mandate of SFOR so that thc Dalton peace
process can contrnue ln a securc cnvrronment. A
ner.v elemcnt rn SFOR after June 1998 rvrll be thc
small specialised unrt of 600 men entrusted *rth
police lasks, mainly' to assist the retum of refu-
gecs to areas where they' are rn a mrnorit)' Ac-
cording to the present operatronal plan. thrs unrt
u'rll rnclude trvo battahons mainl.v formed of
Italian carabinren and Argentinran pohce.
269 As earlv as autumn 1997, Unrted States
officrals and cxperts had started to suggest the
inclusron of an 800-1 000 strong pohce unrt rn
SFOR whrch should be all-European Such a unrt
rvould not only be able to fill the gap between thc
non-armed LN Intcrnatronal Pohce Task Forcc
and SFOR armed mrlitary troops, but could also
provide tangrble proof of an cnhanced European
commitment to thc peace process and of
Europe's determmatron to meet rts responsrbih-
tres for the maintenance of peace and stabrlrty on
the continent
270. Your Rapporteur regrets that WEU, rvhich
u,as perfectly' arvare of these proposals, has not
taken up the challenge by cstabhshing the WEU
pohce force the Assembly' proposed in Recom-
mendation 619.
27 | Apart from Bosnra and Herzegovina, there
are other reasons to bc concemed about the
sttuatron rn the Balkans
272. The transfer of control over Eastem SIa-
vonia to Croatra is another step fonvard in thc
peace process m former Yugoslavra.
273 The latest nex,s from Eastern Slavonra.
hou,ever, is not encouraglng. Rehef agencres and
the OSCE are pomtrng out that Serbs are berng
drtven out precemcal because of harassment and
admmrstratrve ethnrc cleansmg It rs reported that
about half the Serbs hvrng rn Eastern Slavonra
tu'o years ago have nou'left whrle the numbcr of
departurcs is risrng darll'
274 A recent address dehvercd b1' Presrdent
Tudlman has prompted a critical response from
the Presrdencl' of the Europcan Councrl m whrch
rt stated that the Croatran Presrdent's rcmarks
cast "serious doubt upon Croatra's corrunltmcnt
to thc terrrtonal mtegrrtv of Bosnra and Herze-
govrna and rts wrllingness to rnclude ethnrc Serbs
and other mlnontres as full and equal members of
the Croatran societ\'". Apparentlr', Europe rvrll
have to monrtor developments closell' and act
u'hen the crrcumstances requtre rf rt does not
\\,ant to lose control of the srtuatlon as it drd be-
fore
77 5 In Kosovo, thc rvorld rs s'rtnessing a cnsls
u'hrch ever1, srngle cxpert on thc Balkans has
been predictlng slnce the beginnrng of thc confltct
tn former Yugoslavra, u'rthout bcrng ablc to
specrfy exactly rvhen rt would crupt Seen from
Presrdent Mrlosel'rc's pornt of I'rcw, howevcr,
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nothrng could be morc logrcal than to plal' thrs
last trump card of hts natronahst pohcl' nght
now
276 He has lost hrs \\'ars agarnst the Slovcnr-
ans. Croats and Mushms Hrs influcnce on el'cnts
rn Bosnia and Hcrzegovtna dtmtnrshed after the
Novembcr I997 electrons tn Rcpubhka Srpska
u'hrch resulted rn a victory for the moderate
Serbs Even tn that part of Bosnra and Herze-
govlna, a ma.lorit1, of Serbs have understood that
thc deep economlc cnsls can onlv bc overcome tf
thev cooperate rn the Dalton peace tmplementa-
tlon process and deny potver to the corrupt lead-
ers rn Pale u'ho had the support of the Serb Gov-
ernment rn Belgrade
277. Mr Milosevtc has no lntentlon of makrng
the urgentll'-nceded reform of the cconomv tn his
oun natrve Serbia. because that uould mcan the
cnd of the gnp on the economv that he and hrs
chquc have and, ultrmatell', the cnd of hrs polrtr-
cal pox'er After the last Serbran parltamentary
electrons of September 1997, hts soctahst partv
u'as obhged to dcal urth the popular radtcal
natronahst, Mr Seselj. m ordcr to have enough
support rn parltament for a coalttton go!'emmcnt.
u'hrch uas estabhshed rn March 1998 after pro-
tracted negotiatrons Wrth Mr Sesel; breathrng
doun hrs ncck- Mr Mrloscvrc had no chotce other
than to stlr up Serb natronahst fcehngs ovcr
Kosovo rn a dcsperate effort to kecp the tntttattvc
rn polrtrcs
278 Thrs mav u'ell turn agalnst htm. *hcn. as
s'ould appcar to bc the casc. polrttcal leaders tn
Vo;r'odrna. Sandlak. Sumadr.la and Montcncgro
take thrs opportunlt)' to comc up urth stmtlar
rdeas as have nol bccn put fonvard b1' thc
Kosovar Albanrans
219 It rs unhkely therc u'rll be a fullr'-flcdged
armed conflrct rn Kosovo becausc of the power
balance bctu'cen thc Scrb armed forces and
policc unrts and the rudrmentan' equrpment and
trarrung of the Kosovar Albanians, not to speak
of the fledglmg Kosovo Liberatron Arml' On the
other hand, a gucrnlla-krnd of rcslstance agamst
the Serbs cannot be ruled out rf Mr Mrlosevtc
remarns rnflexible The example of the agreement
on the status of Northern Ireland has shorin that
therc are tuo essenttal requtrcments for a suc-
cessful dralogue bct\\'een the trvo partles ln
Kosovo rnternatronal medtatton and an open
agcnda The consequcnces of a possrblc confltct
in Kosovo could be serious enough to constttutc
a thrcat to peacc rn that reglon. 1usttfr'tng tnter-
natronal actron tn accordancc u'tth Chapters VI
and VII of the Unrted Natrons Charter. and WEU
actron rn accordance u'rth Article VIII.3 of the
modrfied Brussels Trcatr
280 As has been satd earltcr m the prescnt re-
port, the maln responsrbrhtv for preventtng a spl-
ral of vrolence rcsts rvtth the peoples and gov-
srrunents of the regron But other European gov-
cnments also hal'c a rcsponstbtlttr They' have
thc mcans to hclp and should therefore ltstcn
carcfullv to u'hat thc countrtes of the Balkan rc-
gron consrder to be rcqurrcd to prcvent the vto-
lence spreadrng Thc) should not hesttatc to
suppll'. urthtn rcason. thc drplomattc. financtal.
tcchnrcal and mrlrtan'tools necded for matntatn-
mg pgace in the rcgron
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APPENDIX
Letter from Mr Glouchkov,
member of the Bulgaritn Delegation to the Assemhly of WEtl,
to Mr Blaauw, Rapporteur
6 May 1998
At thc lnltlatrvc of thc Bulgarian Mrnrster for Forergn
south-eastern European countnes (Bulgana, Greece, thc
srgned a joint statemcnt on the srtuation rn Kosovo on
found to the crisis that u,ould fuII1, respcct the human
Albanrans as lvell as existing borders
Affairs, the mrnisters for forergn affarrs of five
Republic of Macedonra. Romanra and Turkel,)
l0 March 1998 It callcd for a solutron to be
rights and fundamental hberties of the ethnrc
On 25 March tn Bonn, the mrnrsters for forergn affarrs of srx countries of the reglon (the fir,e
menttoned abovc plus Slovenra) and the Pnme Mrnrster of Albanra held a mceting charred b1, the
Bulgarian Mrnister for Foreign Affarrs and srgned anothcr lornt statcment on the conflrct rn Kosor.o
They declared that the countnes of south-castcrn Europe \\'ere prcpared to bc drrectlv rnr,,olved rn the
search for u'avs of sctthng the crisrs
Ot 23 Apnl. the Bulgarian Mtnrster for Foreign Affairs proposed that the Contact Group countnes
draw up a set of pnnciples that u'ould promote the start of a substantral and responsrble dralogue among
the partres to the Kosovo confltct u'rth thc ob;ectrve of arnvrng at a lastrng solutron bascd on an
accommodatton of thc posttrons of all the mterested countrrcs and of those of the rntematronal
communrt)'
***
Meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affuirs of the countries of south-eastern Europe
Joint statement
Bonn. 25 Morch 1998
"The Mrnrsters of Foreign Affarrs of the countncs of south-eastern Europc 
- 
Bulgana. the Formcr
Yugoslav Repubhc of Macedonia. Grecce. Romanra. Slovenra and Turker' 
- 
together urth thc Pnme
Mtntstcrof Albanra. met tn Bonn on 2-i March 1998 to drscuss the srtuatron rn Kosovo.
Thc Mlntstcrs expressed therr hrgh appreclatron of the coopcratron alreadv estabhshcd urth thc
Contact Group states in thrs regard
The Mmtsters agreed that the countrles of the rcgron should har,'c a drrect rolc rn findrng thc solutrons
to the crlsls ln Kosovo. Thev erpressed the readmess of thcrr states to partrcrpate m rcgular
consultattons rvtth thc Contact Group Thev also notcd the lmportance of the dralogue on a brlateral
basrs betu'een countnes of the regron and the Contact Group states
The Mrnisters heid a thorough dtscussron on the recent devclopments concerning the srtuatlon rn
Kosol'o They noted that thcrc ls a progress in the recent davs espccrallv rn vreu' of thc accord to
rmplement the Agreement on Educatron
The Mrntsters hstened u'ith partrcular lntercst to thc interventron of Mr Fatos Nano. Pnme iVftnrstcr
of Albanra Tho' cxpressed their appreclatlon of the responsible positron of the Albanran Government
touards the crisrs rn Kosovo
They agrecd that the solutton to the rssuc of the future status of Kosovo should be found on a
mutualll' acccptablc basrs u'ithin the borders of the Federal Rcpubhc of Yugoslavra.
)t
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The Mrnrsters believe that rnternatronal medratlon ma), hclp the conflrctrng partles b1' polrtrcal means
to glve up therr extremc dcmands and adopt a rcconcrhatory and compromlslng approach
The Mrnistcrs expressed a common view that an1' measures agalnst thc Federal Rcpubhc of
Yugoslavra should take rnto account the polrtrcal and economrc stabrlrty of south-eastern Europe and
should not harm the rntcrests of the states of the region Sancttons. tf necessary, should be polrtrcal
rather than economrc
The Minrstcrs expressed the vierv that thcre should be a balanced approach of measures and
lncentlves m order to convince both conflicting partres to actrvely' pursuc therr dialogue
The Mrnisters called for an enhanced internattonal monitoring tn Kosovo
They underhned the rmportance of the invrolabrlity of the borders of thc states rn the region includrng
those of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Thev pard a spectal emphasts on the final demarcatron of
the border between the the Former Yugoslav Repubhc of Macedonra and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavra."
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